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CHAPTER ONE  
1. Introduction and Background of study 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act came into operation on the 1st of May 1998.1 It came into 
action for a period of two years and was capable of being extended for two years at a time by 
proclamation. After being extended, the principles have now been entrenched with some 
amendments in the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act.2 This Act changed the way in 
which sentencing is done in South Africa drastically.3 It provides for the imposition of 
mandatory minimum sentences.4 Mandatory minimum sentences require that a court impose a 
specific sentence but allows the court to impose a different sentence if that court finds that 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances exist.5 The discretion to depart from the mandatory 
minimum sentences is contained in Section 51(3) which states that: 
‘If any court referred to in ss 1 or 2 is satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which 
justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the sentence prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter 
those circumstances on the record of the proceedings and may thereupon impose such a lesser sentence.’  
 The Act did not apply retroactively and it only applies to crimes that were committed after the 
1st of May 1998.6 It does not apply to child offenders at all as of the year 2013.7 It was held that 
                                                          
1 Act 105 of 1997 which will be referred to hereafter as The Act. 
2 Act 38 of 2007. 
3 S Terblanche “Mandatory and Minimum Sentencing: Considering S51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
1997” (2003) 2003 (1) Acta Juridica 194. 
4 Section 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. It is important to note that S52 is no longer 
applicable and the other sections have been amended. 
5 S Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 3ed (2016) 47. 







the Act limited children’s constitutional rights and this limitation could not be justified.8 It 
provides for mandatory minimum sentences for a variety of serious offences (which are 
described in Schedule 2). Prior to the enactment of the Act, the public had also lost faith in the 
justice system. This was reflected in a number of newspaper reports. According to one report it 
was said that people were being murdered, raped, abused and hacked through gangster violence.9 
Other reports commented as follows: 
a) Tough jail sentences have to be imposed for child abusers as this is the only way that the 
crime may be taken seriously and discourage offenders from committing it.10 
b) Serious crime is never going to come to an end in South Africa unless something is done 
about it.11 
According to the S v Mofokeng12 case, the Criminal Law Amendment Act was enacted to restore 
the public’s faith in the justice system i.e. give them a sense that harsher sentences were being 
passed for serious crimes. 
In Malgas13 the legislature's intention for enacting this Act was summed up as follows: The 
legislature wanted an approach that was consistent and standard from the courts unless there 
were reasons to impose a more lenient sentence. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 S 51(6) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (as amended by s 266 of the Judicial Matters Third 
Amendment Act 42 of 2013) also Centre of Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 
(2) SACR 477 (CC). 
8 Centre of Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC) at para 49 
and 63. 
9 The Citizen 26 October 1995, quoted in Neser JJ “Mandatory Minimum sentences in the South African context” 
2001 (3) Crime Research in South Africa 2. 
10 Sowetan 10 November 1995, quoted in Neser JJ “Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the South African context” 
2001 (3) Crime Research in South Africa 2. 
11 Pretoria News 26 October 1995 quoted in Neser JJ “Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the South African context” 
2001 (3) Crime research in South Africa 2. 
12 1999 (1) SACR (W) 








Mujuzi is of the opinion that the Act was a reaction to the declaration of the death penalty as 
unconstitutional in the S v Makwanyane14 case. 
The legislature's intention has been expressed similarly and the expressions are mostly along the 
lines of deterrence15 and combating the prevalence of violent crime in South Africa.16 Although 
other purposes have also been identified, the main objects seem to be that of deterrence and 
crime prevention. 
The Act was not welcomed without criticism. It has been criticized by judicial officers and also 
by one of the country’s sentencing experts, Professor Terblanche.17 The criticism is mainly based 
on the Act’s poor language and the fact that the legislator’s intention has been difficult to 
determine. There has also been disapproval of the whole scheme mainly on the premise that the 
Act limits the discretion of judicial officers.18 There have also been constitutional challenges on 
the basis that the Act is in violation of the principle of separation of powers and other 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.19 
                                                          
141995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
15 S v Mofokeng 1999 (1) SACR 502(W) at 526, S v Willemse 1999 (1) SACR 450 (C) at 454, S v Homareda 1999 
(2) SACR 319 (W) at 325, S v Khanjwayo 1999 (2) SACR 651 (O) at 658, S v N 2000 (1) SACR 209 (W) at 226f, S 
v Boer 2000 (2) SACR 114 (NC) at 122, S v Eadie 2001 (1) SACR 185 (C) at 187, S v Kgafela 2001 (2) SACR 207 
(B) at para 23; S v Arias 2002 (1) SACR 518 (W). 
16 S v RO 2010 (2) SACR at paras 40-41. 
17 S Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2ed (2007) 75 where he remarks that there is hardly any 
provision in the Act that is not problematic. 
18 S Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing In South Africa 3ed (2016) 51. 







2. Motivation for the research 
As previously stated, courts can only depart from the prescribed sentences if they find 
‘substantial and compelling’ reasons to do so. The words ‘substantial and compelling’ were 
probably adopted from the Minnesota state sentencing guidelines.20 The legislature did not give 
any guidance or define what ‘substantial and compelling’ means.21It left it entirely to the courts. 
In general, the Act should be interpreted just like any other piece of legislation. This means that 
the words should be given their primary meaning, balanced by the legislator’s intention as well 
as the principles that are entrenched in the Constitution.22 According to Dodo,23 establishing the 
true meaning of ‘substantial and compelling’ has proven to be difficult and has led to different 
interpretations of what the words actually mean. Some judicial officers have limited the 
discretion to ‘unusual and exceptional factors’ while some to cases of disproportionality. This 
indicates that the courts have divergent views about what the legislature meant and this is 
problematic. 
The seminal judgement on how to interpret the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ is the case of 
S v Malgas.24 This case provides a step-by-step approach on how the courts should approach the 
decision on whether to depart from the prescribed sentences or not. Although this guidance has 
been given, it seems the problem has not been solved. In the case of S v PB,25 a case that was 
decided over a decade after the seminal judgement in Malgas, the judicial officer still posed the 
question, ‘What are substantial and compelling circumstances?’ This dissertation seeks to 
                                                          
20 D Van Zyl Smit “Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Departures from them in substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 27. 
21 The term ‘substantial and compelling’ is mentioned in Section 51(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 
22 S v Dzukuda 2000(2) SACR 443 (CC) at para 38, also Brandt v S (2005) 2 All SA 1 (SCA) at para 9, S v 
Mofokeng 1999 (1) SACR 502 (W) at 516. 
23 S v Dodo at para 10. 
24 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA). 







examine how the courts have been interpreting the phrase ‘substantial and compelling ‘and if the 
manner in which they are interpreting it is giving effect to the intention of the legislature. Cases 
that were decided before the Malgas case will be briefly examined to determine the way they 
interpreted the clause and those after Malgas will be examined to determine whether Malgas has 
led to one uniform interpretation. More importantly a comparison will be made with the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines where the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ was adopted. 
This comparison will be necessary to determine how the state of Minnesota has dealt with 
problems of interpretation and if South Africa can adopt the same solutions. 
 3. Rationale of the study 
A study into how the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ is being interpreted by the South 
African courts is of great importance. The crimes that are listed in the Act are serious so it is 
crucial that the Act be interpreted the way the legislature intended it. Sentencing goes to the heart 
of how justice is being administered in a country so it is of importance that it is done properly, 
fairly and consistently. If flaws exist within the current system, these will need to be addressed 
for the proper administration of justice. 
4. Key Questions asked 
This dissertation seeks to address the following key questions: 
a) What were the reasons behind the enactment of Criminal Law Amendment Act which 
provides for mandatory minimum sentences? 
b) How have the courts been interpreting the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’? 
c) Did the practical method that was put forward in S v Malgas lead to one consistent way 







d) What are the differences between the Minnesota state sentencing guidelines and how did 
they deal with problems of interpretation? 
 
5. Research Methodology 
The research is theoretical. Information will be gathered from journals, public books on the 
subject and more importantly cases that have interpreted ‘substantial and compelling’ before 
sentencing an offender. It is a qualitative study. 
6. Structure of the study 
The study will consist of five chapters. 
Chapter One 
Chapter One will introduce the topic and give background information on the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act as well as outlining the research problem and motivation behind the research. 
Chapter Two 
Chapter Two will discuss the constitutionality of the Act and examine how cases that were 
decided before Malgas interpreted ‘substantial and compelling’. An examination into the 
practical guidelines for interpretation that was done in Malgas will also be done. 
Chapter Three 
Chapter Three is an examination of the cases that were decided after the Malgas case paying 








This Chapter examines the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines where the phrase ‘substantial and 
compelling’ was adopted from. A comparison is made between the two systems i.e. South 
Africa’s sentencing laws and that of Minnesota. This will be to determine how they have dealt 
with problems with interpretation and whether South Africa can learn a thing or two. 
Chapter Five 
This is the final chapter. It will summarize all the findings of the study, discuss the problems that 
















An examination of the constitutionality of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
and an analysis of the interpretation of ‘substantial and compelling’ in S v Malgas and the 
cases that were decided before it. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
When the Criminal Law Amendment Act was enacted a lot of questions arose as to whether the 
Act was constitutional or not. The questions were mainly centered on the fact that the Act limited 
the powers of the judiciary by prescribing for them which sentences to impose when certain 
crimes are committed. The first part of this chapter discusses the interpretation that was given is 
S v Malgas for ‘substantial and compelling’26 The constitutional judgment in S v Dodo was 
decided after the judgement of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Malgas27 and will be discussed 
second to avoid repetition.  
Before the judgement of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Malgas28 there was no uniform way 
of interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’. The case of S v Malgas put forward a practical 
interpretation of ‘substantial and compelling’. Judge Marais saw a need to consider the question 
of what ‘substantial and compelling’ means afresh because the interpretations that were being 
placed by the other courts were ‘discordant’.29 The case of Malgas is the seminal judgment on 
how courts should deal with ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’.30 The second part of 
this chapter will be looking at how the cases that were decided before Malgas interpreted 
‘substantial and compelling. Thereafter, there will be an analysis of the Malgas judgment. The 
                                                          
26 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 
27 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid at para 6. 







analysis will focus on how the case interpreted “substantial and compelling” by unpacking the 
guidelines that were given in the case. 
2.2 Interpretations by cases before S v Malgas 
The interpretations of ‘substantial and compelling’ before the Malgas case can be divided into 
three main categories namely: 
a) Cases that used a strict method of interpretation 
b) Cases that used a more lenient approach in interpretation. 
c) Cases that used a more balanced approach in interpretation. 
2.2.1 THE STRICT APPROACH 
The interpretation in the Mofokeng31 case is described as extreme and falls under the first 
category of the interpretations i.e. strict interpretation. This case involved crimes of kidnapping 
and two counts of rape.32  The rape committed in this case fell under one of the ‘aggravating 
circumstances’ that are mentioned in Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Act therefore warranting life 
imprisonment. The details of the Act will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  Judge Stegmann 
was of the view that by enacting the Criminal Law Amendment Act parliament had stripped the 
judiciary of its discretionary powers.33 He went on to say that for a court to simply disregard the 
sentences that were proposed by the legislation because it prefers its own would be ‘emasculate’ 
the legislation.34 Stegmann J also emphasized how parliament had not given any guidance or said 
what ‘substantial and compelling’ means but rather left it to the courts to decide on the matter.35 
                                                          
31 S v Mofokeng 1999 (1) SACR (W). 
32 S v Mofokeng at page 506. 
33S v Mofokeng at page 520. 
34S v Mofokeng at page 523. 







He went on to mention that in a case where men had taken a woman and repeatedly raped her it 
was not easy to find circumstances that can be described as substantial and compelling to warrant 
a departure from the prescribed sentence.36  
The judge explained that in order for ‘substantial and compelling circumstances to be present, 
there must be exceptional factors that point to injustice in the event that the prescribed sentence 
is imposed.37 According to the case, factors that would be ordinarily regarded as aggravating or 
mitigating  a sentence could not be weighed to see if they are substantial and compelling unless 
if they were of an unusual or exceptional kind that the parliament could not have had them in 
mind when they enacted the provisions.38 If a court was to do this, it would mean that the court 
was preferring its own judgment to that of the parliament and would compromise the court's 
integrity.39 The judge in Mofokeng mentioned the following circumstances and held that they 
were not enough to constitute substantial and compelling circumstances. (These are also 
circumstances that are generally considered in rape cases): 
a) The absence of previous convictions 
b) Comparative youthfulness of the offender 
c) Unfortunate factors in their backgrounds 
d) The probable effect that liquor had on the crime 
e) The absence of dangerous weapons 
f) The fact that the complainant had not suffered any injury.40 
 
                                                          
36S v Mofokeng at 523. 
37S v Mofokeng at 523c. 
38 S v Mofokeng at 524d. 
39 S v Mofokeng at 523b. 







These factors were said to be substantial but it was on the basis that they are the type of factors 
that the parliament had in mind when it enacted the legislation that the judge in Mofokeng found 
them not to qualify as “substantial and compelling”. They were described as ‘everyday 
circumstances’ and it was said that they cannot be held to be compelling in this case. On this 
basis both the accused persons in this case were sentenced to imprisonment for life as prescribed 
by the legislation. 
Perhaps the striking thing about this case is that it seems to suggest that the parliament’s 
proposed sentences are the most appropriate and courts should not depart from them simply 
because they are more severe than sentences a court would impose ordinarily. Stegmann J uses 
the word ‘emasculate’ which suggests that courts should be careful by all means when it comes 
to substituting the sentences that have been ordained by the legislature. The factors that 
Stegmann J dismisses as everyday circumstances are the factors that are present in many cases 
especially rape but also other crimes. The dismissal of these factors gives the impression that 
substantial and compelling circumstances are rarely found or rather they can only be found in 
unique cases.  
Smit 41is of the view that in this case Stegmann J confused circumstances that are exceptional 
with ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances. He mentions that this is evident from the 
words he used and the pronouncement that for circumstances to qualify as ‘substantial and 
compelling’ there must be unusual and of an exceptional kind. 
                                                          
41 D Smit “Sentencing and Punishment” (1999) available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/centre_publications/constitlaw/pdf/28-Sentencing%20and%20Punishment.pdf 







The Mofokeng judgment was however criticized for its extreme interpretation and the court in 
Malgas described it as an ‘erroneous’ interpretation.42 The court in Malgas went on to comment 
that ‘the frequency of infrequency of the existence of a set of circumstances is logically 
irrelevant to the question of whether or not circumstances are substantial and compelling’43 This 
means Malgas did not agree with the requirement in Mofokeng about ‘substantial and 
compelling’ meaning circumstances that are exceptional in nature. 
There have been judgments that have agreed with the logic in Mofokeng. The court in S v Boer44 
supported the approach that was given in Mofokeng. S v Zitha and Others45 involved rape which 
warranted the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. When it came to considering the 
issue of substantial and compelling circumstances the judge referred to the Mofokeng case and 
agreed with the notion that the legislature must not be emasculated.46 It does this by quoting the 
case of S v Mthembu47 which interpreted ‘substantial and compelling’ to mean any factors that 
are of solid significance than can’t be left out when deciding the issue of sentencing48 Zitha was 
in strong disagreement with this and went on to quote the explanation that was given in 
Mofokeng then fully endorsed it.49 This case also concludes that ‘youthfulness’ was not intended 
to be regarded as a substantial and compelling circumstance by the legislature50 the following 
factors were disregarded:51 
a) That a life sentence provides no rehabilitation 
                                                          
42 S v Malgas at para 10. 
43 S v Malgas at para 10. 
44 2002 (2) SASV 114 (NKA) 121 e-f. 
45 S v Zitha 1999(2) SACR 404 (W) 409 e-g. 
46 Ibid 410c. 
47 S v Mthembu and Another Case no 365/98 delivered on 22 October 1998 
48 Ibid. para 6-7. 
49 S v Zitha at page 410- 411. 
50 S v Zitha at page 411 i. 







b) That the accused persons had a tough background. 
c) That a life sentence would be unfair and actually punish the accused for their 
background. 
d) Accused was uneducated. 
e) That accused does not comprehend how wrongful his act was 
f) That the accused had never had proper guidance 
g) That the accused had been in custody since August 1998 
h) That the accused can be described as a street child and street children are often rejected 
by society. 
 
In S v Segole and Another,52 the accused had been convicted on counts of robbery, kidnapping 
and rape.53 In this case the court was obliged to impose life imprisonment on rape and 15 years 
on the robbery charge if substantial and compelling circumstances could not be found.54 In 
making a determination of what substantial and compelling means the judge held that he is 
bound to the provisions in the Act and has an obligation to give effect to it. The judge also fully 
agreed with the sentiments shared in Mofokeng and held that according to the facts of that case a 
departure wasn’t warranted as there were no substantial and compelling circumstances.55 In 
Segole the judge also made a comment on how the facts of that particular case were of a more 
serious nature than the ones that were in the Mofokeng case.56 
                                                          
52S v Segole 1999 (2) SACR 11 (W) At 123(j). 
53 Ibid 117. 
54 Ibid. 122. 








In S v Madondo,57 the judge emphasized that there need not be easy intervention from the courts 
to impose lesser sentences. He mentioned that ‘compelling reason’ was ‘more than just a 
disparity between what the court feels may be sufficient and the prescribed minimum’. Smit58 
comments that in Madondo, Judge Squires did not criticize the legislation but his main focus was 
to ascertain what substantial and compelling means. Squires set a high standard for departure as 
he focused not so much on what substantial and compelling means but made comments that a 
court should only depart if in that instance the prescribed sentence is so inappropriate that no 
reasonable court would impose it. 
In the case of S v Kgafela59 an accused had planned the murder of her husband by hiring an 
assassin to shoot him. This falls under Part 1 of Schedule 2 with a prescribed sentence of life 
imprisonment. In this case the court imposed the prescribed sentence commenting that because 
the murder was planned there was no reason to depart from the prescribed sentence. In another 
example, the case of S v Majola60 where an accused had stabbed his girlfriend to death, a crime 
falling under Part 2 of Schedule 2 with a prescribed minimum sentence of 15 years. The accused 
was a first offender, a responsible member of the society and the crime wasn’t premeditated. 
Despite this, the court imposed the prescribed sentence stating that the attack was brutal and that 
the deceased had been pregnant. 
                                                          
57 Unreported judgement of (N) case CC/99 delivered on 30 March 1999. 
58 D Van Zyl Smit ‘Sentencing and Punishment’ (1999)   available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/centre_publications/constitlaw/pdf/28-Sentencing%20and%20Punishment.pdf  
Accessed on 3 March 2017. 
59 2001(2) BPD at 207. 







2.2.2 THE LENIENT APPROACH  
In the case of S v Majafela61 the judge was of the view that the starting point of interpretation 
was to give consideration to all aggravating and mitigating factors in the traditional way. With 
this view the new Act was only an attempt to introduce conformity and was not to be regarded 
as introducing any new change to the sentencing principles.62 This case was decided by Judge 
Leverson who also held the same approach in the case of S v Mthembu and Others63 where he 
said that the ‘legislature did not intend the phrase to signify a stricter criterion than these 
previously regarded as mitigating factors’. This same approach was endorsed in the case of S v 
Cimani64 where the judge did not give a comprehensive definition of what ‘substantial and 
compelling’ means65 but held that the nature of the circumstances (that are meant to warrant a 
departure from the prescribed sentence) must be such that to convince the reasonable mind that a 
lesser sentence is a proper one and that it is justified after regard has been had to the aggravating 
and mitigating factors as well as the interests of society weighed against the interests of the 
offence.  
This approach is so broad that it allows a court to consider factors it would normally regard as 
relevant to sentence and as a result impose a sentence of its choice.66 In this case factors like 
absence of physical injury, youthfulness, the lack of previous convictions, the fact that the 
accused showed remorse and that there were prospects of rehabilitation were regarded as 
                                                          
61 Delivered on 22 October 1998 in the WLD. 
62 South African Law Commission “South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 91: Sentencing (A New 
Sentencing Framework)” 2000 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp91.pdf  accessed on 15 
September 2017 at page 28. 
63 Unreported case, Case No 365/98. 
64 Unreported judgment of the ECD, case CC 11/99m delivered on 28 April 1999. 
65 D Van Zyl Smit ‘Sentencing and Punishment’ (1999)   available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/centre_publications/constitlaw/pdf/28-Sentencing%20and%20Punishment.pdf  
Accessed on 3 March 2017 at 28-2A. 







substantial and compelling.67 These same circumstances were not regarded as substantial and 
compelling in the Mofokeng case. 
2.2.3 THE BALANCED APPROACH 
In the case of S v Blaauw68 the judge held that it had not been specified that the circumstances 
needed to be exceptional and that in order to determine whether a departure from the prescribed 
sentences was warranted, one had to look at the cumulative effect of the aggravating and 
mitigating factors of a case. If in light of these the sentence would be grossly inappropriate then 
there would be need for imposing a lighter sentence otherwise the judge would have to impose 
the prescribed sentence.69 
The approach adopted in Blaauw is described as a more balanced approach of interpretation.70 
This balanced approach has more to commend it as it allows the courts to keep some discretion 
and not undermine the intention of the legislature.71 It has also been described as difficult to 
apply as it requires the courts to consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances as it does 
traditionally.72 The cases of S v Homoreda,73 S v Shongwe74 and S v Dithotze75 also agreed with 
this approach. 
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In S v Abrahams76 it was held that an offender who had raped his own daughter was not a threat 
to society and this was a mitigating factor that could be considered along with others in deciding 
to depart from the prescribed minimum sentence. In S v Jansen77 the court held that the words 
substantial and compelling meant that the court had to consider all the available mitigating 
factors to see if they carry enough weight for the court to depart from the prescribed sentence. 
The judge S v Swartz78 also expressed the same view79 as that of Jansen and mentioned that the 
key to interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’ was in looking at the crime first, in particular the 
moral blameworthiness that could be attached to that crime and the circumstances in which it 
was committed. The judge was of the view that this limits the factors that have to be considered 
when trying to determine whether substantial and compelling circumstances exist.80 This logic is 
also followed by the case of S v Van Wyk81 where the approach that if a minimum sentence 
induces some shock then this would justify departure from the minimum sentence. After 
rejecting this approach this case interpreted ‘substantial and compelling’ to mean the 
circumstances that were previously referred to as mitigating factors. 
An example that shows the application of the approach of considering mitigating factors can be 
seen in the case of S v Shongwe82 where an accused had raped a 9 year old. Since the girl was 
below the age of 16 years this meant that the offence fell under Part 1 of Schedule 2 with life 
imprisonment as the prescribed sentence. The accused however did not receive the prescribed 
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sentence after consideration of mitigating factors. The factors that the court considered were that 
the accused was 47 years old, had not clashed with the law for a period of 20 years, was married 
with two children and had fixed employment for 9 years, the fact that the complainant was his 
son’s stepdaughter etc. The court then held that imposing a life sentence on the accused would be 
shocking, excessive and out of proportion and for this reason the court imposed a sentence of 15 
years. 
It is clear that before the Malgas83 judgment there have been divergent views about how 
‘substantial and compelling’ should be interpreted. Interpretations were either strict, lenient or 
balanced. The lenient approach in Mofokeng84 emphasizes the fact that the legislature saw it fit 
that the prescribed sentences be imposed for the specific crime. This approach also emphasizes 
the need for strict and severe sentences and believes the prescribed sentences should only be 
departed from in the event of exceptional circumstances. It is seen that it is not only Mofokeng 
that agreed with this approach as it was adopted by some cases that followed. Some cases 
adopted a more lenient approach. The lenient approach focuses more on what are usually 
regarded as mitigating factors in sentencing and it is left to the judge to make an assessment of 
whether the prescribed sentence would be fair. When it comes to the balanced approach of 
interpretation, the judge has to look at the cumulative effect of these circumstances and then 
come to a conclusion on whether the prescribed sentence would be just or not. 
The intention of the legislature was that the court's’ response to crime be consistent. If judges are 
interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’ inconsistently and following different standards, then 
they are not giving effect to the intention that the legislature had. 
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2.3 THE MALGAS INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 51(3) 
2.3.1 General Approach 
The views of the Supreme Court of Appeal, as set out in S v Malgas fall to be discussed. 
Guidance was definitely needed on how a court must approach a case where the mandatory 
minimum sentences have to be applied. Generally, the provisions have to be read in light of the 
values that are enshrined in the Constitution.85 As the provisions were initially meant to be in 
effect temporarily, the courts must bear this in mind as well as they make an attempt to interpret 
what is meant.86 The fact that the prescribed sentences were enacted to deal with serious crime is 
also of great importance when it comes to interpretation. This means that the courts are required 
to approach the question of sentencing conscious of the fact that the legislature has ordained the 
prescribed sentences as the ones that should be ordinarily imposed for the crimes listed.87 The 
intention of the legislature when it enacted these provisions was to standardize the response of 
the courts to the commission of these serious crimes, make the sentences severe and also achieve 
consistency.88 It is therefore of great importance to view the sentences as ones that have been 
deemed appropriate by the legislature. 
2.4 INTERPRETING ‘SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING’ 
The Act states that when a court is satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist 
in a particular case, it can then deviate from the prescribed sentence. The court is to enter the 
circumstances it deems substantial and compelling on record and spell them out.89 
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The central thrust of the words ‘substantial and compelling’ is that prescribed sentences are not 
to be departed from lightly or for ‘flimsy reasons’ like sympathy, circumstances or information 
that is favorable to the offender, the ‘first offender’ theory, any doubt to the efficiency of the 
legislation that the judicial officer might have, differences in the degree of participation or 
circumstances of co-offenders.90 There has been no indication from the legislature that the 
traditional factors that are considered when it comes to sentencing should be excluded from the 
consideration of what ‘substantial and compelling’ means.91 This means that the mitigating and 
aggravating factors that are usually taken into account during sentences do have a role to play. 
What it means is that the totality of these circumstances that are traditionally taken into account 
should be enough to justify a departure.92 In previous cases, for example in S v Mofokeng (which 
used a strict method in interpreting the provision), there has been suggestions that the factors 
ordinarily taken into account in the sentencing process should be eliminated and that for factors 
to qualify as ‘substantial and compelling’ they must be ‘exceptional or rare’.93 
Some courts which have had to deal with the problem have resorted to adopting thoughts that are 
used by judges hearing appeal cases. This is problematic because this wasn’t the intention of the 
legislature.94 The courts are supposed to consider the particular circumstances of each case and 
all the factors that are relevant to sentencing and then afterwards impose a sentence it sees fit.95 
Therefore, a court that is exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot approach the question of 
sentencing as if it were the trial court then substitute the sentence arrived at simply because it 
prefers it. This can’t be done in the absence of material misdirection by the trial court.96 When 
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applying Section 51, the trial court must not act like an appellate court during the process. This is 
so because it is not in this situation confronted by previous exercise of judicial discretion but 
faced with a statutory directive to impose a particular sentence according to the schedules in the 
act. In doing this, the trial court is doing so for the first time and there would have been no prior 
considerations.97 Cases that suggest that such an approach to the section is the correct one are 
erroneous as they unjustifiably limit the power that is given to a trial court by Section 51(3) to 
conclude when a lesser sentence is justified.98 
The fact that the legislature has refrained from giving any guidance as was done in Minnesota is 
significant.99 It shows that the legislature deliberately left it to the courts to establish what it 
means. In doing so, they must however treat the prescribed sentences as being suitable for the 
crimes and must not depart from them unless there is weighty justification to do so.100 A 
departure is justified by making reference to circumstances which can be seen to be substantial 
and compelling.101 
Questions have been raised as to how ‘substantial and compelling’ should be examined. The 
questions center upon it being examined as two words or as one. It was held in Malgas that the 
words substantial and compelling must be examined conjointly as the legislature refrained from 
using the word ‘or’ in favor of the word ‘and’.102 It is not possible to list all circumstances that 
rank as substantial and compelling and those that do not.103 One just has to keep in mind that the 
prescribed sentences are regarded as ordinarily appropriate and personal distaste for the 
legislation is not enough to warrant a departure. When justifying a departure, the court must be 
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careful of rationalizing circumstances of an offender that are not sufficient enough to be regarded 
as ‘substantial and compelling’. There is no harm for a court to use, as a starting point, past 
sentencing patterns as a provisional standard for comparisons when deciding whether the 
prescribed sentence is unjust or just. However courts must not use mere discrepancy between 
them as a sole criterion for departure as more is required from them.104 
When a court feels ‘uneasy’ about a prescribed sentence and this unease hardens into a 
conviction that an injustice will be done by imposing the sentence, it can be a result of the court 
not being satisfied that the circumstances of that case render the prescribed sentence 
disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the legitimate needs of the society. If the unease is 
as a result of a consideration of certain circumstances then the court is entitled to characterize 
those circumstances as substantial and compelling.105 The injustice need not be shocking; the 
mere fact that an injustice will occur when the prescribed sentence is imposed will suffice.106 It is 
not right to suppose that it is only factors diminishing moral guilt of the offender that will qualify 
as substantial and compelling.107 It is clear that the courts are a freer to depart from the 
prescribed sentences than has been said in the previously decided cases and it is up to the courts 
to judge whether or not circumstances of a particular case justify a departure.108 
2.5 THE PRACTICAL METHOD OF INTERPRETATION PUT FORWARD IN 
MALGAS 
In paragraph 25 of the Malgas case, the judge summarized a practical interpretation for the 
courts to use when they are faced with the question of what constitutes ‘substantial and 
compelling’ circumstances. The summary is as follows: 
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1. Section 51 hasn’t limited the discretion that the courts have when imposing sentences in 
respect of the offences that are listed in the Schedules. 
2. Courts are required to approach the sentencing exercise conscious of the fact that the 
prescribed sentences should ordinarily be imposed in the absence of substantial and 
compelling circumstances. 
3. Crimes listed are to be given severe, consistent and standardized responses from the 
courts unless there are convincing reasons for a different purpose. 
4. The prescribed sentences are not to be departed from ‘lightly or for flimsy reasons’. 
Circumstances or information favorable to the offender, undue sympathy, reluctance to 
imprison first offenders, personal doubts of the judicial officer relating to the efficiency 
of the legislation and marginal differences in the personal circumstances or degrees of 
participation between co offenders are to be excluded. 
5. Emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the type of crime and the need for 
effective sanctions against it but this does not mean that all the other considerations have 
to be rejected. 
6. All the factors that are traditionally taken into account in sentencing continue to play a 
role with none of them excluded. 
7. The ultimate impact of all the circumstances must be measured against the yardstick 
‘substantial and compelling’ and the factors must cumulatively justify a departure. 
8. It is constricting to use the concepts developed in dealing with appeals as a criterion. 
9. If upon the consideration of all circumstances a sentencing court is satisfied that the 
prescribed sentence would be unjust i.e. disproportionate to the crime, criminal and the 
needs of the society resulting in an injustice, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence. 
10. It must always be taken into account that the crimes listed in the Act have been singled 







2.6 THE APPLICATION OF THE PRACTICAL INTERPRETATION IN MALGAS 
After laying down the method of interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’ Judge Marais went on 
to apply it to the facts of the case109 In the Malgas case, the appellant had been convicted for 
murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The appellant had shot the deceased in the head 
while he lay asleep at his home. Appellant had been living for about a month in the deceased’s 
house with his wife (Carol) and children. A quarrel had taken place between the deceased and his 
wife and later the deceased had told the appellant that he loved her and the appellant had replied 
that she wanted nothing to do with him. The deceased then locked himself in the bathroom and 
fired a shot causing his wife and the appellant to think that he had committed suicide but he later 
emerged and had drinks with friends until half past 1 in the morning. 
After 3 am, Carol woke the appellant and gave her a pair of gloves, a jersey and a firearm. 
Appellant was then instructed to wear the gloves to avoid her fingerprints appearing and to wear 
a jersey so that there are no gunpowder marks and traces of blood would not be on her attire. 
Appellant was then told by Carol to shoot the deceased or Carol would burn the house down with 
petrol. Carol reminded her that the deceased had struck her the previous evening and that she had 
to shoot him. With the help of Carol, the appellant then attempted to pass off that what had 
occurred was an act of suicide but the appellant later confessed to a friend leading to her arrest. 
In the court a quo the judge had concluded that the circumstances of this case could not be 
regarded as ‘substantial and compelling’ and regarded himself bound by the approach that was 
used in the Mofokeng case as he was in agreement with that approach.110 The judge had accepted 
that carol had been the instigator but did not consider it a weighty factor when measured against 
the fact that the appellant had killed the deceased. The appellant’s remorse was considered but its 
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importance was minimized by the judge stating that that subsequent remorse was not something 
exceptional. After balancing these factors, the court a quo found that they did not amount to 
substantial and compelling circumstances.111 
When it came to considering the appeal and applying the new method of interpretation, Judge 
Marais said the following: 
Although there was planning and premeditation and the crime was carried out in the execution of 
a common purpose and there is need for a severe punishment, the personal circumstances of the 
accused i.e. her youth, clean record, her vulnerability to Carol’s influence and the fact that she 
was dragooned into the commission of the offence by a domineering personality are strong 
mitigating factors. The fact that she showed remorse and is young enough to make rehabilitation 
a prospect even after a long period of imprisonment were also among the facts that were noted 
by Marais. He held that these circumstances cumulatively regarded, satisfied the judge that a 
sentence of life imprisonment would be unjust and qualified as substantial and compelling 
circumstances. The appellant was therefore sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and life 
imprisonment was set aside.112 
2.7 AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN IN MALGAS 
Malgas is the seminal judgment on how courts should deal with the issue of what ‘substantial 
and compelling circumstances mean.113 According to Terblanche,114 the essence of the Malgas 
decision can be separated into the following four aspects: 
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a) The sentences prescribed by the legislature are the point of departure as the sentencing 
court does not start the sentencing process from a ‘clean slate’.115The prescribed 
sentences should be ordinarily imposed and not be departed from for unjustified reasons. 
b) When the circumstances of a particular case warrant a departure from the prescribed 
sentences, the court should not hesitate to depart. As the case mentioned, courts are now 
freer to depart from the prescribed sentences than they were in the past. 
c) All the traditional factors that are relevant to sentencing should be weighed in order to 
determine whether a departure is called for and it is the cumulative effect of these factors 
that will point the court to one way or the other.116 
d) The judicial officers must consider whether the prescribed sentences leave them with a 
sense of ‘unease’. 
 
In S v Kgafela,117 the judge was of the opinion that ‘substantial and compelling’ had not been 
‘textually’ interpreted but had been relegated to the effect of an instinctive reaction and response. 
The instinctive response takes refuge in the notion of injustice or unjust sentences resulting in the 
imposition of a lesser sentence bearing in mind the well-known triad of the criminal, the crime 
and the interests of society. In short, the judge is of the view that in Malgas, the judge did not 
define but rather put forward an approach or mentioned how judges should react when faced 
with this problem. 
Another view was that Malgas has resulted in a hybrid sentencing scheme that uses techniques 
from the sentencing guidelines to depart from the legislatively prescribed sentencing practices. 
The result of this is that lesser sentences are imposed on the accused based on factors related to 
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the crime as opposed to the victim. The long-term results are a sentencing scheme that misuses 
factors to depart from the mandatory minimums.118 While others are happy that Malgas has 
brought certainty to the interpretation and application of Section 51,119 another viewpoint is that 
Malgas did not define substantial and compelling but rather put forward an approach that uses 
the traditional guidelines to depart from the prescribed sentences. Others are of the view that 
Malgas should be followed because there are not over or under emphasizing of any of the 
circumstances that could take place and this means that a proper balance will be struck.120 
In the case of DPP KZN v Ngcobo121 it was mentioned that the case of Malgas is a good starting 
point when it comes to trying to make a conclusion on whether to depart from the prescribed 
minimum sentences. It was also said in this case that the principles that were mentioned in 
Malgas are ‘enduring’ and ‘uncomplicated’. 
2.8 Constitutionality of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
After the enactment of the minimum sentencing legislation, it was foreseeable that this piece of 
legislation would come under constitutional scrutiny. This is mainly because by prescribing a 
sentence that should be imposed in a particular circumstance, the Act strips the judiciary of its 
discretion in one way or the other (thereby violating the constitutional principle of separation of 
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powers). According to Neser, the constitutionality of the provisions in the Act is/was disputed on 
two grounds namely:122 
a) It is accepted that any piece of legislation that directs a court to impose sentences that are 
not proportional to the severity of crime may be unconstitutional on the grounds that the 
punishment that is imposed ends up being ‘cruel’ ‘inhumane’ and of a ‘degrading nature’. 
b) It is argued that mandatory minimum sentences infringe on the accused’s right to a fair 
trial. This argument is based on the fact that under mandatory minimum sentences there 
is a ‘fragmentation’ of the trial. The trial court pronounces an accused guilty and a judge 
from the High Court must impose the sentence.123 The accused will be detained for this 
long period between being found guilty and the sentencing. 
 
Chief Justice Corbett commented in S v Bruce, S v Toms124 that mandatory minimum sentences 
were an undesirable intrusion by the legislator on the judge's discretion to determine the 
punishment given to people convicted of statutory offences and that the enactment of the 
provisions is calculated to produce grave injustice.125The leading case relating to constitutional 
review of the legislation is S v Dodo.126 The constitutional challenge in the Dodo case was based 
on three grounds which are: 
1) Whether the statute is in violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 
(The text of the Final Constitution does not explicitly refer to the doctrine of separation of 
powers) This doctrine dictates that there is a separation of powers between the three 
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branches of government namely the judiciary, the executive and the legislature. It further 
dictates however that there should be appropriate checks between these branches to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.127 
2) Whether section 51 (1) read with section 51(3) (a) compels the High Court to pass a sentence 
that violates section 12 (1) (e) of the Constitution which states that there is a right not to be 
punished in a ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading way’?128 
3) Whether section 51(1) read with section 51(3) (a) of The Act is inconsistent with section 
35(3) (c) of the Constitution which guarantees to every accused person the right to ‘a public 
trial before an ordinary court’. This argument is in the sense that a court bound by Section 
51(1) is no longer an ‘ordinary’ court.129 
 
In dealing with the issue of separation of powers, the court in S v Dodo concluded that, while 
our constitution recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers, ‘such separation  does not 
confer on the courts the sole authority to determine the nature and severity of sentences to be 
imposed on convicted persons’.130 
The court went on to mention that both the legislature and the judiciary have legitimate concerns 
when it comes to sentencing131  but however ‘the concomitant authority of other branches in the 
field of sentencing must not infringe the authority of the courts in this regard’.132  The court also 
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concluded that it is ‘sufficient to hold that the legislature is not empowered to compel any court 
to pass a sentence that is inconsistent with the Constitution’.133 
In essence, the court is stating or rather putting forward that inasmuch as there is a separation of 
powers between the judiciary and the legislature, one can’t say the legislature has the sole 
authority in determining sentences. This is because both branches have a legitimate interest in 
the severity of sentences. This justifies the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences by the 
legislature and supports that the principle of separation of powers is not violated. 
In dealing with the issue of section 12(1) (e) of the Constitution, the court in Dodo held that 
section 51(1) of the Act does not require the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment 
where it would be inconsistent with the offender’s right in section 12(1) (e). This is because of 
the determinative test articulated in Paragraph I of the summary in Malgas,134 which provides 
that “If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is 
satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be disproportionate to 
the crime, the criminal and the needs of the society, so that an injustice would be done by 
imposing the sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence.” This makes it clear that the 
sentencing court is not obliged to impose a sentence that will be in violation of section 12. 
 In dealing with the issue of violation of section 35(3) (c), the court held that ‘the failure of the 
separation of powers argument and the conclusion that section 51(1) is not inconsistent with the 
Constitution for any other reason has fatal consequences for the section 35(3) argument.’135 It 
concluded that this the Act would only violate this section of the Constitution if section 51 (1) 
has ‘some material effect on their independence or if it deprives them of some judicial function 
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of such a nature that they could no longer properly be classified as ordinary courts’136 and this 
was not the case. The court in Dodo thereby rightfully concluded that section 51 was not in 
contravention of any constitutional principle. 
The Dodo case silenced the constitutional argument against mandatory minimum sentences. 
They continue to be in effect and the courts are now focusing more on interpretation issues than 
challenging the system itself. This makes an enquiry into how ‘substantial and compelling’ is 
being interpreted a very necessary one. 
This judgment is important because it confirmed the Malgas decision i.e. the practical approach 
to interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’. Of more importance is the fact that it is a 
constitutional judgement meaning that it entrenched the principles that were put forward in 
Malgas. Proportionality is the central feature of Dodo’s confirmation of the Malgas case,137 
which makes it necessary to discuss this case. Although the Malgas case does not explicitly 
mention proportionality except for the part where it described an unjust sentence as one that will 
be ‘disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of the society’,138 it is clear that one 
of the intentions of the legislature was not for the courts to impose disproportionate sentences. 
The constitutional judgment in Dodo was of the view that it was unnecessary to consider the 
divergent views that had been given by previous courts on what substantial and compelling 
means. It mentioned this on the basis that the Malgas case had put forward a practical method of 
interpreting what substantial and compelling means.139 It described the step-by- step method put 
forward in Malgas as an ‘overarching guideline’ and one that must be employed by all judicial 
officers who are faced with the problem of deciding whether or not they should depart from the 
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prescribed sentence.140 This shows that the CC in Dodo was in full agreement with the method 
of interpretation that was given in the Malgas case. 
That being said, proportionality is a key element when it comes to deciding which sentence to 
impose. It was discussed in detail in the Vilakazi141 case which is also a confirmation judgement 
when it comes to the principles that were put forward in the Malgas case.  
In Dodo it is mentioned that proportionality is a key factor in determining whether punishment is 
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ particularly where the issue is how much time an offender should 
stay in prison.142 Proportionality is at the heart of the inquiry because the Constitution stipulates 
that a person may not be deprived of his/her freedom without just cause.143 Dodo ‘decreed’ the 
constitutional requirement of proportionality when it comes to the imposition of sentences.144 
The ‘proportionality’ requirement applies whether a court imposes a sentence using the 
mandatory minimum sentencing principles or the usual principles that govern the imposition of 
sentences.145 So this means that when a sentence is not proportional it automatically means that 
it is unconstitutional as well.146 According to Terblanche, there have been several other 
judgments that have mentioned proportionality147. One of them is Vilakazi, 148where 
proportionality was a key factor in striking down a sentence of life imprisonment that had been 
imposed by the court a quo for rape. Even though the prescribed sentences should be followed 
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when they apply, ‘proportionality to the seriousness of the offence is a higher value which 
overrides the prescriptions’.149 
The Dodo case is in full agreement with all the steps that were put forward in Malgas as a way of 
interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’. It quotes all the guidelines in its judgement and leaves 
none. And most importantly it puts forward that any judicial officer faced with the question of 
whether or not to depart from a prescribed sentence should use the guidelines in the Malgas case. 
 
2.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
According to the judgement of the Constitutional Court in the Dodo case, the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act is in line with the Bill of Rights. Therefore, there was no need to strike the piece 
of legislation down on the basis that it was not in line with the Constitution. 
The court in Malgas rejected the interpretations that limited ‘substantial and compelling’ to 
factors that are exceptional or factors that the legislature could not have had in mind when they 
enacted the legislature. The judgement did not give a ‘textual’ interpretation or define what the 
terms mean but made it clear that the words are to be viewed and interpreted conjointly. The 
approach that the judgement said was to be used when it comes to determining whether a lesser 
sentence should be imposed is one where the mitigating factors that are traditionally considered 
in the sentencing process have to be looked at. After looking at these factors, their cumulative 
effect must be weighed against the yardstick of ‘substantial and compelling’. It is after this 
exercise that a court will be able to determine whether to depart from the prescribed sentence or 
                                                          







not. The judgment also emphasizes that the prescribed sentences are not to be departed from 
lightly and at the same time strict interpretation is erroneous. 
3. CHAPTER THREE 
An analysis of the interpretations of ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances after the 
Malgas case. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous Chapter discussed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Malgas.150  
This chapter will now examine how the South African courts have reacted to the Malgas 
interpretation of the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’. This will be done by an analysis of the 
cases that were decided after Malgas taking a specific look at whether they endorsed Malgas or 
are in disagreement with the proposed method of interpretation. Analysis will focus on rape, 
robbery and murder cases specifically looking at how ‘substantial and compelling’ is being 
interpreted and whether the courts have adopted one uniform way of interpretation when it 
comes to the various crimes. This chapter will outline the facts of each case and reasoning of the 
judicial officer. A critical analysis of the judgements will be done in the final chapter. 
3.2 RAPE CASES  
The rape cases will be discussed in chronological order.  The cases that will be discussed are S v 
Abrahams,151 S v Mahomotsa,152 S v Njikelana,153 S v M, 154 S v Nkomo,155 S v Vilakazi,156 S v 
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PB,157 S v PB,158 S v MS159 and S v Uithaler.160It is important to note that with rape cases, there 
has been some guidance on what should not be considered as substantial and compelling 
circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence. The following are listed:161 
a) The complainant’s sexual history. 
b) Apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant 
c) Any religious or cultural beliefs that the accused has about rape. 
d) Any relationship that existed between the complainant and the accused person prior the 
commission of the crime. 
3.2.1 S v Abrahams 
In the case of S v Abrahams the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned a decision of the High 
court where a sentence of seven years had been imposed on an accused who had raped his 14 
year old daughter.162 It had been held in the High Court that the fact that the accused was not a 
threat to society was a mitigating factor that could be considered in deciding whether or not to 
impose life imprisonment. The SCA held that the High Court had misdirected itself in imposing 
a sentence of 7 years. SCA held that the judge had erred in failing to take into account the sexual 
jealousy and the possessiveness that had motivated the rape.163 
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In this judgement it was remarked that any suggestion that rape within a family is in any way 
acceptable is wrong. It was held that the High Court had failed to take into account the damage 
that the complainant had suffered as a result of the rape. The 7 year sentence was accordingly 
substituted with one for 12 years.164   
3.2.2 S v Mahomotsa 
In S v Mahomotsa the accused had been charged with two counts of rape. He was sentenced to 
six years’ imprisonment for the first charge and 10 years’ imprisonment for the second one. This 
was after it had been found that substantial and compelling circumstances existed and the 
prescribed sentence of life imprisonment had to be departed from.165 Both of the complainants 
had been raped more than once and it had been alleged by the court that they were fifteen years 
old.166 The court a quo had used the test that was set in the Mofokeng case which states that for 
factors to qualify as substantial and compelling they must be exceptional in nature.167 The 
Appeal Court mentioned how this test was rejected in Malgas (factors need not be exceptional in 
nature to qualify as substantial and compelling).168 The Appeal Court noted that inasmuch as the 
court a quo had followed the test that was put forward in Malgas it had ‘erred materially’.169 
In an inquiry to find out whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed, the court a 
quo considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case.170 The mitigating 
factors that were considered by the court a quo were that the accused was young, he had spent 
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eight months in prison at the time of sentencing, and the complainant had sustained no physical 
or psychological damage from the rape as they had been already sexually active.171 The 
aggravating factors considered were that the accused had a previous conviction of having sex 
with a girl less than 16 years, the accused committed a second offence while awaiting trial for 
the first one and he had lied that he was 17 years old when he was 23 in order to get a lighter 
sentence.172 
The Appeal Court held that the court a quo had erred in finding that no physical or psychological 
damage was suffered by the complainants as a result of the rape.173 It mentioned that while it is 
‘theoretically’ possible that a victim of rape may not suffer any other psychological damage 
other than that which is experienced during the rape, this is ‘highly unlikely’.174 The Appeal 
Court further mentioned that the fact that the complainants were young girls makes it even more 
unlikely that they would not have suffered any psychological damage as a result of the rape.175 It 
held that it is impossible to quantify psychological damage and neither is it right to approach the 
question of sentencing assuming that no psychological harm was done.176 
In deciding whether the court a quo had not misdirected itself by arriving at the decision that 
there were substantial and compelling circumstances in casu, the Appeal court had to look at the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that were considered. A man’s virility was held not to 
play any role in the sentencing process as this would have the effect of taking away the moral 
blameworthiness of accused people in most rape cases. It was held that the court a quo had 
misdirected itself in this regard and there was need by the Appeal Court to consider the 
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sentences afresh because of this.177 There was emphasis178 about how the Malgas case held that 
the prescribed sentences should not be departed from for ‘flimsy reasons’. The Appeal Court 
mentioned how the sentence of life imprisonment was the one that had to be ordinarily imposed 
in this case as the complainants had been raped more than once.179 
It was held that the fact that the complainant in the other count had had sexual intercourse two 
days before she was raped was not a factor that had to be taken in favor of the accused. It was 
irrelevant according to the appeal court.180 The fact that the accused had lied about his age which 
had been taken as an aggravating factor was also held not to be sufficient. This was because the 
accused had given his correct age of 23 before the start of the trial.181 
The Appeal Court put emphasis on the fact that just because a particular instance of rape falls 
within the categories delineated in the Act, it doesn’t mean life imprisonment has to be imposed. 
This it held as one of the ways put forward by the Malgas and Dodo case in interpreting the 
prescribed sentences.182 In the event that substantial and compelling circumstances are found, 
the court can deviate from the prescribed sentence.183 Furthermore, Mahomotsa emphasizes that 
there are differences in seriousness when it comes to rape cases and these differences play a 
crucial role in the sentencing process.184 Mahomotsa185 quotes S v Abrahams186  which mentions 
that some rapes are more serious than others and life imprisonment should only be reserved for 
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those cases where there are no substantial and compelling circumstances that justify the 
imposition of a lesser sentence.  
The Appeal Court went on to consider the sentences that had been imposed by the court a quo. It 
held that in respect of the first count, the accused youthfulness and other personal circumstances 
such as the fact that his previous conviction (though sexual) did not involve non-consensual sex 
favor departure from the prescribed minimum. The learned judge went on to say that the same 
could not be said about the second charge. This was because within a period of two months after 
the accused had been released into the custody of his grandmother he committed a similar 
offence.187 After giving careful consideration to all the aspects involved in the case, the appeal 
court described the Mahomotsa case as a ‘borderline’ one.188 The judge was of the view that the 
prescribed sentence of life imprisonment was too severe in this case and would result in an 
unjust sentence even after considering the second charge.189  The judge goes on to mention that 
the sentences that were prescribed by the court a quo did not reflect the seriousness of the 
offence and described them as ‘woefully inadequate’190 He then imposed a sentence of 8 years 
for the first count and 12 years for the second count.191 
3.2.3 S v Njikelana 
In S v Njikelana192 the accused had raped the complainant more than once. At the time of the 
commission of the offence the complainant was 16 years old 8 months.193 Before considering if 
life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence, Thring J lists all of the guidelines that were put 
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forward in the Malgas case. Thring J goes on to mention that the Constitutional Court in the 
Dodo case endorsed Malgas therefore these guidelines are of great importance.194 
The cumulative effect of the following circumstances was held to justify a departure from the 
sentence of life imprisonment that had to be ordinarily imposed in this case:195 
a) The accused was a fairly young man. He was 24 years old at the time of the commission 
of the crime. It was held that from the facts it can be concluded that he is ‘somewhat 
immature’ as on the night of the crime he was socializing with someone who was nine 
years younger than him at the time. 
b) The accused had no previous convictions. 
c) The accused was uneducated and had no degree of sophistication. 
d) On the day the crime was committed, the accused had consumed a lot of liquor. Thring J 
remarked that alcohol reduces a person's ability to resist temptation and it reduces 
inhibitions. Thring J also noted that prior to the rape, the complainant had been drinking 
with the accused as friends and this shows that this rape had not been planned over a long 
period of time. 
e) The complainant was not seriously injured. The lacerations were described by the doctor 
as ‘superficial’ and she had no permanent injury but only a small scar on her forehead. It 
was noted that even though the complainant had not sustained any serious physical 
injuries she had suffered mental trauma and distress. She had become emotionally 
unstable, forgetful and withdrawn after the crime. Her schoolwork had also suffered. 
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f) The accused had been in custody for 35 months awaiting trial and sentencing. According 
to Thring J, this was too long a time and therefore unreasonable to subject the accused to 
a sentence of life imprisonment. 
 
Like any other case, the aggravating circumstances had to be weighed against the mitigating 
factors. The aggravating circumstances that were identified in this case were as follows:196 
a) The accused had pushed the complainant off a bridge even though she had not sustained 
serious injuries as a result of that. 
b) The accused had use a degree of force in raping the complainant. 
c) The accused had abused the relationship he had with the complainant. They had been 
drinking together and the complainant viewed him as a friend. 
 
Despite this, Thring J held that the sentence of life imprisonment would be unjust in this case. 
The accused was then sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment.197 
3.2.4 S v M 
This case involves the rape of a minor. The accused had raped his stepdaughter when she was 14 
and 15 years old. This case emphasizes what was put forward in Malgas that the judicial officers 
should treat the prescribed sentences as the punishment that has been ordained by the legislature 
for the specific crimes.198 It also emphasizes that the cumulative impact of the normal factors that 
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are taken into account is what determines whether a court it to depart from the prescribed 
sentences or not.199 
The mitigating factors that existed in this case were as follows: 
a) The accused was a first offender and had a clean record prior the commission of the 
offence. 
b) He had tendered a plea of guilty. 
c) There had been no harm inflicted on the victim. 
d) He had spent nearly 12 months in custody. 
 
Judge Satchwell however went on to mention that there is no authority that states that just 
because an accused has a previous clean record, that in itself can be taken as one of the factors 
that justify departure from the prescribed sentences.200 He also held that a plea of guilty in this 
particular case did not amount to a substantial and compelling circumstance either.201 Another 
important thing to note from this judgement is that Satchwell mentioned that in a rape case where 
the child is under 16 years, absence of bodily harm should not constitute a substantial and 
compelling circumstance.202 
In conclusion, Judge Satchwell said:203  
“I have noted that the accused is a first offender and that he has spent nearly 12 months in custody, that he 
pleaded guilty, and that no violence, other than that of the rapes themselves, were perpetrated by him 
upon his victim. For the reasons I have given, I do not find that any of these factors individually constitute 
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substantial and compelling circumstances. Nor do I find that, in combination, they constitute weighty 
consideration to justify departure from the prescribed sentence.” 
She went on to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.204 
3.2.5 S v Nkomo 
In S v Nkomo the appellant was convicted of rape and kidnapping. He had laced the 
complainant’s cold drink with alcohol and forced her into a hotel room and raped her. The 
complainant tried to escape but appellant put her back into the hotel room and raped her four 
more times during the night. The complainant was kicked, slapped and asked to perform oral 
sex. When the complainant escaped the following morning she went to the police station. The 
appellant was arrested and charged then sentenced to three years on the kidnapping charge and 
referred to the High Court for sentencing on the rape charge. The High Court did not find any 
substantial and compelling circumstances and therefore sentenced him to life imprisonment.205 
The appellant appealed against the sentence of life imprisonment. His appeal was allowed and 
the sentence of life imprisonment was set aside and replaced with 16 years’ imprisonment. This 
was on the basis of the following circumstances which the Appeal Court found to be substantial 
and compelling:206 
a) The appellant was young; He was 29 at the time of the commission of the rape. 
b) The appellant was employed. 
c) There were chances of rehabilitation.207 
                                                          
204 S v M at para 117. 
205 J D Mujuzi “Prospect of rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling circumstance to avoid imposing life 
imprisonment in SA: A comment on S v Nkomo” (2008) (21) (1) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 4. 









3.2.6 S v Vilakazi 
In this case, the appellant was charged and convicted on one count of rape. The victim was 16 
years old. This case quoted extensively from the Malgas case and the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Dodo. It stressed that punishment must always be proportionate to the 
particular offender for human beings are not to be treated as ‘ends to themselves and never as a 
means to an end’.208 This court emphasized proportionality by stating that ‘the essence of the 
cases of Malgas and Dodo is that disproportionate sentences are not to be imposed and that 
courts are not vehicles for injustice’.209 Terblanche refers to this case as the confirmation 
judgement of what was held in Malgas.210 
According to the Act, if a victim is of the age of 16, the prescribed sentence is life 
imprisonment. In this case the High Court had found that there were no substantial and 
compelling circumstances and had imposed life imprisonment.211 
In this case, the judge passed a comment about the mandatory minimum sentencing regime 
when it comes to sentencing in rape cases. He mentioned that it was striking that there is no 
gradation between 10 years’ imprisonment and life imprisonment. The 10 years prescribed for 
rape progress immediately to life imprisonment once any aggravating factors are present. This is 
irrespective of how many aggravating factors there are, the degree in which they are present or 
whether the offender is a first offender or a repeat offender.212  The judge in Vilakazi was of the 
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view that the only solution to dealing with this problem (as it results in disproportionate 
sentences) is to approach the Act in the manner that was laid down in the Malgas case. 
The case went on to consider the Malgas case. It stated that it is clear from the terms that were 
used in Malgas that before every court imposes a prescribed sentence it has to assess upon the 
consideration of all the circumstances of the case, whether the prescribed sentence is 
proportionate to the particular offence that has been committed. This is to be done taking into 
account all the factors that are traditionally considered in the sentencing process.213  Vilakazi 
quoted from paragraph 14 of Malgas which stresses that in the event that substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist, a court is free to depart from the prescribed sentence.  Vilakazi 
further emphasized how erroneous the Mofokeng judgement by saying that the Malgas case does 
not say that the prescribed sentences must be imposed as the norm and are to be only departed 
from only as the exception.214  
In paragraph 17, Vilakazi emphasizes again that for factors to qualify as substantial and 
compelling they need not be exceptional. The correct approach is that courts are to approach 
every case conscious of the fact that the legislature has ordained the prescribed sentences as 
proper for the crimes that are listed.  In Vilakazi the court a quo had held that prescribed 
sentences must be imposed in ‘typical cases’ and may be departed from where the case is 
‘atypical’. This was said to find no support in the Malgas judgement, furthermore, there was no 
guidance on what a ‘typical’ case was like or guidance on how a ‘typical’ case can be 
identified.215Any circumstances that would render the prescribed sentence disproportionate to 
the crime that is listed in the Act would qualify as substantial and compelling and therefore 
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justify the imposition of a lesser sentence.216 When it comes to disproportionality the question 
arises about how a court decides whether the sentence is disproportionate to the crime that 
would have been committed. Vilakazi mentioned that this is a question that will be decided by 
the courts upon the consideration of all the circumstances involved in that case. This it 
mentioned with the case of Malgas in mind. This is evident from the fact that after mentioning 
it, Vilakazi goes on to say that the essence of the Malgas and the Dodo case is that 
disproportionate sentences are not to be imposed for whatever reasons and that the courts should 
not be ‘vehicles of injustice’.217 
It is important to note that the Vilakazi judgement agreed with and applied the logic that was put 
forward in the Malgas case. Paragraph 20 is one of the clear indications among many. In this 
paragraph Vilakazi seems to have discovered the essence of the whole Malgas judgement and 
attempts to sum it up in a simple way and suggesting that this is the correct method of 
interpretation.  Here it was emphasized that there was now no need to revisit constructions of the 
Act that were considered in the Malgas case as the essence of the judgement was that courts are 
never compelled to impose a disproportionate sentence. The case of whether a sentence is 
disproportionate or not is to be determined by considering all the material circumstances of the 
case keeping in mind what the legislature has ordained for that particular crime. Most 
importantly the prescribed sentence doesn’t need to be ‘shockingly unjust’ before a court can 
depart from it. It is enough for the sentence to be departed from mainly because it would be 
unjust.218 
The Appeal Court in Vilakazi was of the view that the court a quo had not made a proper 
evaluation of the circumstances in which the offence had been committed. If there had been any 
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evaluation, it was mentioned that it was ‘superficial’.219 The clear impression that was got from 
the court a quo was that the prescribed sentence was going to be imposed unless the personal 
circumstances of the appellant were ‘exceptional.’ Vilakazi mentioned that this approach is not 
permissible according to the test that was set down in the Malgas case. It emphasized that 
Malgas required a court to apply its mind as to whether the sentence was proportional to the 
crime that has been committed and it was clear that the Appeal court felt that the court a quo had 
not done so.220 
It was on this basis that the Appeal Court felt that the decision that had been taken by the court a 
quo could not stand. It therefore went on to do an evaluation on whether life imprisonment was 
the appropriate sentence in accordance with the approach that had been laid down in Malgas.221 
In making the evaluation the Appeal court mentioned that it had given all the material facts from 
the record but was going to choose to highlight some of them in order to make a determination 
whether the maximum sentence would be proportionate to the crime that had been committed.222 
The Appeal Court highlighted on the facts that there hadn’t been no ‘extraneous’ violence and 
no physical injury other than that inherent to the offence had been caused, there had been no 
threat of ‘extraneous’ violence, the appellant had worn a condom which had at least minimized 
the risk of pregnancy and the transfer of STI’s and the complainants evidence that she was raped 
twice is curious bearing in mind that the appellant was any charged with 1 count.223 
Personal circumstances like whether the accused is married or single, how many children one 
has, whether one is employed or not were said to be under the ‘flimsy’ grounds that were 
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mentioned in Malgas. The Appeal Court however mentioned that these factors could be useful in 
another respect.224 The question of whether an accused can be expected to offend again is a 
material consideration when it comes to sentencing according to this case. It was said that this 
can be determined by looking at the circumstances of the person in question.225 In casu, the 
appellant was 30 years old and hadn’t been in trouble with the law before, he had stable 
employment and a stable family. The Appeal Court was of the view that these circumstances did 
not portray the accused in a negative way or speak badly about his character.226 
The court now went on to view all the factors as a whole. It found that the complainant’s age 
had been the feature that was more aggravating in the whole case. The judge was of the view 
that the age itself didn’t justify what would otherwise have been a sentence of 10 years to be 
replaced by the maximum sentence of life imprisonment.227 After consideration of all these 
factors, the appeal court in Vilakazi held that a sentence of fifteen years would be substantial to 
emphasize the gravity of the offence that was in question. It held that making the accused pay 
for the rest of his life was a ‘grossly disproportionate’ sentence.228  
3.2.7 S v PB 
In the case of S v PB229 the judgement of the trial court held that there had been no substantial 
and compelling circumstances and that departing from the prescribed sentences would be to do 
what was warned against in the Malgas case about not departing for flimsy reasons and 
‘speculative hypotheses favorable to the offender’. The court quoted a lot from the Malgas 
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judgement but not in relation to all the aspects that were mentioned in the practical guideline. 
The judgment stressed more on how the prescribed sentences should be a point of departure. 
 3.2.8 S v PB 2013 
In this judgment there were a total of five judges as opposed to the other two cases where the 
bench consisted of three judges. In this case it was repeated that the prescribed sentences should 
not be departed from for flimsy reasons.230The court also posed a very important question, what 
it described as ‘the most difficult question’. This question is ‘What are substantial and 
compelling circumstances’? Terblanche finds this question surprising as the cases of Malgas and 
Dodo were supposed to have provided an answer to this question and the courts have had fifteen 
years to develop the practical interpretation that was put forward in Malgas.231 In giving a 
comment, the case of S v PB ‘complained’ that the term substantial and compelling 
circumstances can be stretched to mean so many things and that it can even accommodate 
ordinary mitigating circumstances that are ordinarily taken into account during sentencing. It was 
held that the process of determining substantial and compelling circumstances involve making a 
value judgement.232 
S v PB finds the Malgas case very ‘illuminating and helpful’, in particular the paragraph which 
talks about how when a court feels uneasy about the prescribed sentence they are entitled to 
depart.233 
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3.2.9 S v MS 
In the case of S v MS234 the appellant had been convicted in the regional court for six counts of 
raping his eleven-year-old step-daughter. He had been sentenced to six terms of life 
imprisonment which were to run concurrently. This had happened while Mrs KS and gone to a 
funeral and left four children in the care of the appellant.235 Upon Mrs KS’s return, she noticed 
that the complainant was sick, could not walk properly and spent most of her time in bed. The 
complainant only reported the rape five days later and alleged that the appellant had taken all the 
children’s blankets from their bedroom and told them to sleep in his room.236 Appellant had 
threatened to kill the complainant and went on to rape her for six consecutive nights.237 The 
complainant was under the belief that the appellant would kill her as there was a knife close to 
her head.238 
Victor J remarked that the appellant’s attitude reflected an approach to women (especially his 
stepdaughter) that wasn't impressive. It shows that he views women as people he can do anything 
he pleases with.239 Victor J described the attack as brutal and what made it more brutal was that 
it had been done to an eleven year old who had been placed under his care. He further 
emphasized that the prescribed sentences should never be departed from for ‘flimsy’ reasons.240 
With regards to how he was going to go about with the sentencing appeal, Victor J mentioned 
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that he was going to start by taking into account the traditional factors that must be considered 
when it comes to sentencing.241 
In this case the court a quo had considered the Criminal Law Sentencing Amendment Act which 
lists certain factors that should not be taken into account when considering substantial and 
compelling circumstances in rape cases.242 The aggravating circumstances that were considered 
were the following:243 
a) The victim impact study report. 
b) The fact that the appellant was HIV positive. 
c) The substantial amount of planning it had taken to execute the crime bearing in mind that 
there was a missing key in the bedroom the children normally slept in. 
d) The complainant will carry emotional scars for the rest of her life. After the rape she had 
become fearful, did not socialize and had dropped out of school for two years. 
 
Victor J found none of the personal circumstances that were considered by the court a quo to be 
substantial and compelling. These were the following:244 
a) The appellant had a low schooling level. 
b) He had to take care of his ill mother from a young age. 
 
It was held that at the age of 44 these scars from childhood could not have influenced the 
appellant to rape his stepdaughter. Furthermore, he had not shown any remorse and no 
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personality disorders had been suggested.245 Victor J described this as ‘the worst possible kind of 
rape’ and dismissed the appeal which meant the six terms of life imprisonment stood.246 
3.2.10 S v Uithaler 
The case of S v Uithaler247 is a more recent case and it can be able to give us a clear picture of 
case the appellant and the co accused were charged with two counts of rape. The appellant 
pleaded guilty to both counts. They had approached the complainant and her male companion 
and then forced the complainant to accompany him to the nearby bushes where he raped her 
vaginally and anally. The co-accused did the same248. The appellant was sentenced to 28 years’ 
imprisonment after finding that substantial and compelling circumstances existed for the 
imposition of a lesser sentence. The Appeal Court mentioned that Malgas reminds all the courts 
that they should keep in mind what the legislature has ordained for a specific crime and take that 
sentence as the one that should ordinarily be imposed in the event that that crime is committed. It 
also emphasizes on the fact that Malgas mentioned that in the event that substantial and 
compelling circumstances are present, a court should deviate from the prescribed sentence.249 
The circumstances that were taken into account by the court a quo were the following: 250 
1) The fact that the appellant was a first offender. 
2) The fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty 
3) The appellant had not used excessive force in the commission of the crime. 
4) The complainant had suffered no physical injuries 
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5) The appellant was relatively youthful 
 
This was the list of factors that the court a quo considered as substantial and compelling. The 
Appeal Court found it necessary to comment on the fact that because the appellant had not used 
excessive force, this was taken as a factor that could play a part in the reduction of the sentence. 
The Appeal Court was of the view that the fact that an accused has not used excessive force in 
the commission of a rape, does not make the crime of rape ‘less reprehensible’.251 To emphasize 
this point, the court quoted the case of S v MM252 which mentioned that rape violates a person’s 
most intimate private space. Even if there isn’t any violent assault on the complainant, rape is 
still a ‘violent and traumatic infringement’. 
In this case it was held that the sentence of 28 years was inappropriate and it was substituted with 
a sentence of 20 years by the appeal court.253      
3.3 ROBBERY AND MURDER CASES 
The robbery and murder cases that will be discussed are S v Khathi,254 S v Mbatha,255 S v 
Chowe,256 S v Matyityi,257 S v Mahlangu,258 Mthembu v S,259 Buys v S,260 Mogaramedi v S,261 
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Montsho v S,262 S v Ngwenya263 and S v Matjeke.264 It is important to note that in the cases of 
Matyityi and Mahlangu the accused persons were charged with both murder and robbery.  
3.3.1 S v Khathi 
The case of S v Khathi265 involved the murder of a traffic officer. Mr Khathi had murdered a 
traffic officer who had was enforcing law under the South African Police Service Act.266 
According to the mandatory minimum sentencing laws this warrants a sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
As a starting point, Moshidi J took into account the traditional factors that are taken into account 
at the beginning of the sentencing enquiry namely deterrence, rehabilitation, prevention and 
retribution.267 He went on to consider the aggravating factors which he described as 
‘conspicuous’ and listed as follows:268 
a) The murder had been premeditated and the way it was committed was ‘vicious’. 
b) The accused was armed with a deadly weapon. 
c) The deceased was shot 8 times at close range and the intention was to steal his firearm 
and it is common knowledge that weapons are stolen to commit more crime. 
d) The deceased was a law enforcement officer and this was highlighted as a major 
aggravating factor. 
e) The deceased had was fairly young and had left behind a widow. 
f) The accused had two previous convictions. 
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With regards to whether a traffic officer falls into the definition of law enforcement officer, 
Moshidi J held that there is no valid justification for differentiating between a member of the 
traffic police and a law enforcement officer.269 The following personal circumstances of the 
accused were mentioned:270 
a) The accused was 27 years of age  
b) He had low levels of education. 
c) He had a minor daughter aged 7 years old and was unmarried. 
 
Moshidi J held that there was nothing extraordinary in the personal circumstances of the 
accused.271 The case of S v Malgas was quoted with emphasis on the principle that the prescribed 
sentences should not be departed from for ‘flimsy reasons’.272  
After considering all the principles of sentencing and taking into account the personal 
circumstances of the accused, Moshidi J held that there were no substantial and compelling 
circumstances in this case and went on to impose the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment. 
He remarked that in cases such as these where members who hold public office are murdered, 
there is a need to protect society as well as the law enforcement officers and their families and 
dependents.273 
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3.3.2 S v Mbatha 
The Mbatha case involved a murder. The appellant a 46 year old man had shot and killed the 
deceased, who was a 49 year old man.274 The appellant and the deceased had been having a 
discussion about damages worth R2000 that had arisen. Something occurred during the 
discussion that made the appellant lose control and shoot the deceased.275 The murder fell within 
Section 51(2) of the Act therefore warranting a sentence of 15 years unless substantial and 
compelling circumstances were to be shown to exist. A sentence in excess of this had been 
imposed by the trial court. They had imposed a sentence of 20 years. The appeal was against this 
sentence.276 
Wallis J acknowledged that the Malgas case is the authority when it comes to dealing with 
mandatory minimum sentences.277 He goes on to mention that in the Act there is no provision 
corresponding to Section 51(3) (a) where the departure from the prescribed sentences is upwards 
rather than downwards but he is of the view that the remarks or guidelines that were put in 
Malgas are of equal application in a case where a court is considering imposing a sentence that is 
greater than the prescribed minimum.278 Interestingly enough, Wallis J mentions that despite this 
it is not a requirement for imposing a greater sentence that there should be substantial and 
compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of that greater sentence.279 
Wallis J proposes the following approach for when a court wants to impose a greater sentence 
than the prescribed one. The starting point should be the sentence that has been statutorily 
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prescribed.280 After that, the court needs to make an identification of circumstances that make 
that particular case out of the ordinary and different from the other cases so as to make the 
prescribed sentence inadequate.281 The court has to ask itself questions about whether in that 
particular case there exists factors that create a distinction that is material between that case and 
other cases involving the same offence.282 In his view, this enquiry is ‘converse’ one that is taken 
when considering the existence of substantial and compelling circumstances. The courts must 
however keep in mind that in the case of imposing a greater sentence, the court’s discretion is 
much wider and flexible and not limited by the ‘statutory yardstick’.283 
There was therefore a need according to the proposed approach, to identify the aggravating 
circumstances that made this case out of the ordinary. Wallis J mentioned that these aggravating 
factors must be clearly articulated by a court. 284Afterwards there should be a weighing of any 
factors that point in the opposite direction. When this balance is in favor of the imposition of a 
greater sentence then a court may do so.285 
The court a quo had not expressly mentioned that it was contemplating imposing a sentence that 
was greater than the prescribed minimum. This was held to be an irregularity by Wallis J.286 
There was also no indication that the court a quo had viewed the prescribed minimum sentences 
as a starting point with the intention of identifying the aggravating circumstances that justified 
imposition of a greater sentence.287 
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With regards to the factors that had been characterized as aggravating by the court a quo, Wallis 
J was of the view that they had been incorrectly characterized.288 He points out that the 
appellant’s lack of remorse was wrongly used against him.289 His lack of remorse had been 
deduced from the fact that he had given an incorrect version of events in the courts. According to 
Wallis J this was different from those cases where the accused’s lack of remorse can be seen 
through his/her ‘past criminality, punishment and recidivism’.290 Inferring an accused’s lack of 
remorse from his choice to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent has its dangers 
according to Wallis J. Worse is when this is treated as an aggravating circumstance. It was held 
that it is probably for this reason that remorse comes into the scale only in mitigation rather than 
as an aggravating circumstance.291 
The second aggravating factor that had been used by the court a quo was the fact that after 
having shot the deceased, the appellant continued to fire a second shot in the presence of the 
deceased’s son. Wallis J highlights the insignificance of this and also adds that it cannot burden 
the moral blameworthiness of the offender that the second shot was in the presence of the 
deceased’s son. 
The last aggravating factor that was considered was that the deceased and the appellant had a 
good relationship and that there were on good terms. Wallis J was unable to see how this was 
considered to be an aggravating factor.292 
It was held that there had been a misdirection by the trial court with regards to the aggravating 
circumstances and there was also no attempt to weigh in the mitigating factors.293 It was for this 
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reason that the appeal was upheld and the matter was remitted back to the trial court for 
sentencing.294 
3.3.3 Mthembu v S 
In this case the appellant had been indicted in the KZN High Court on a charge of murder. His 
defense was that he had acted in self-defence in order to defend himself against the knife attack 
by the deceased. His defense was rejected and he was charged and sentenced to 18 years 
imprisonment, a sentence in excess of the prescribed one.295 
What had to be decided by the Appeal Court was the correctness of the Mbatha case. The 
Mbatha case had prescribed steps that a court wanting to impose a higher sentences than the 
prescribed one should take.296 It has been long accepted by the courts that once a court finds that 
the cumulative impact of all the circumstances justifies the imposition of a higher sentence then a 
court has no constraints in imposing one.297 In commenting on the Mbatha decision, it was 
mentioned that the fact that subsection 2 of Section 51 of the Act stipulates that the sentence that 
should be imposed should not be ‘less than’ is the clear indicator that the legislation did not in 
any way intend to fetter the discretion of the sentencing court as Mbatha puts it.298 Ponnan JA 
and Petse AJA went on to emphasize the Malgas principle that the courts are freer to depart from 
the prescribed sentences and the discretion of when to depart has been deliberately left to them 
by the legislature.299 
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What follows then from this is that, where a court finds substantial and compelling 
circumstances to exist, it may exercise its decision to depart upwards or downwards.300 The 
difference is that there is no indication that a court must enter the substantial and compelling 
circumstances on record when it chooses to impose a higher sentence.301 Mthembu goes on to 
disagree with what was decided in the Mbatha case regarding the issue that the defense must be 
made aware if a higher sentence is in contemplation by the judicial officer. Mthembu disagrees 
that failure to do such results in a defect in the proceedings.302 While it is true that an offender or 
accused should be made aware that minimum sentencing legislation will apply in their case, the 
same cannot be said for when a judicial officer contemplates imposing a higher sentence than the 
prescribed minimum.303 It is also added that there was no such duty before the coming into 
operation of minimum sentencing legislation and the Act does not make any provision for such a 
duty as well.304 
It was therefore held that Wallis J’s approach in Mbatha that failure to ‘apprise’ the defense that 
a higher sentence is in contemplation cannot be endorsed.305  
The learned judge had identified the following personal circumstances of the appellant:306 
a) He had shown regret. 
b) He was a first offender. 
c) He was a good candidate for reformation. 
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The incident was however identified as one which fell under road rage and there had to be a 
weighing of society’s legitimate interest to drive on the roads without the risk of being murdered 
with the accused’s personal circumstances.307 The case had been compared with the case of S v 
Sehlako308 which had similar facts and had a sentence of 18 years imposed on the offender. The 
court had found no differences with this case and had imposed the same sentence on the 
offender. The Appeal Court found no defects with this sentence and the appeal was dismissed.309 
 
3.3.4 S v Chowe 
In the Chowe310 case, the appellant had been convicted by the regional court in Soshanguve and 
one of the counts was robbery with aggravating circumstances.311 Appellant had been sentenced 
to the prescribed 15 years imprisonment for this charge.312  Appellant had unlawfully robbed the 
complainant of his Nokia phone with aggravating circumstances being present as a firearm had 
been used.313 In the court a quo the following circumstances had been considered:314 
a) The appellant was 26 years old, he was single and had a child who was 7 years old. 
b) The appellant was employed at SASKO and was earning R3000 a month. 
c) The appellant had a previous conviction of housebreaking and theft but since this did not 
relate to robbery in any way, the court a quo treated him as a first offender. 
d) The value of the item that had been stolen was R600 
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The court a quo had mentioned the Malgas case and put emphasis on the fact that in Malgas it 
was held that regard had to be had to all the traditional factors that are taken into account when 
sentencing. The court a quo also emphasized that for circumstances to qualify as ‘substantial and 
compelling’ they need not be rare or exceptional.315 The interesting part about this judgement is 
that Mavundla J was of the opinion that in order to consider whether substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist one had to consider the following things:316 
a) The prospect of rehabilitation has to be considered. 
b) One has to look at the value of the goods that have been stolen. 
c) The manner in which the offence was committed should be looked at. 
d) One must look at whether any physical harm was inflicted during the commission of the 
crime. 
 
In this case, Mavundla J held that the appellant was 26 years old and this made him a good 
prospect of rehabilitation, the value of the goods that had been stolen was only R600, the 
complainant had not been harmed in any way and only had a firearm pointed at them. He held 
that the combination of these factors amounted to substantial and compelling circumstances.317 It 
was on this basis that the sentence of 15 years was substituted with one of 10 years.318 
3.3.5 S v Matyityi   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
In the Supreme Court judgement of S v Matyityi,319 Anthony Cannon’s vehicle had been 
smashed and he had been struck in the face. He was robbed of his phone, cash and bank card. He 
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was then driven to a secluded place where his hands were bound and he was then secured to a 
tree.320 He gave his attackers a false ATM pin and later gave him a correct one and he eventually 
managed to free himself when they had gone to try and withdraw money. He then made his way 
to his uncle's house to get assistance.321 The same assailants struck again, but this time on a 
couple. They also smashed the window and snatched the key. The boyfriend was beaten down 
and the guy who had smashed the car’s window fondled the girlfriend’s breasts and touched her 
inappropriately. They drove to a secluded area where they raped the woman who was in the car 
and removed a set of speakers from the car. They then dropped the two victims off. The lady 
managed to drive to Frere State Hospital but unfortunately her boyfriend was pronounced dead 
upon their arrival.322 
The three perpetrators were indicted in the Eastern Cape High Court on one charge of murder 
and rape and two charges of robbery.323 The respondent unlike his co-accused expressed a 
willingness to plead guilty. Their trials were separated and he was sentenced to 25 years’ 
imprisonment for murder and rape. This was appealed in the Matyityi judgment as it was felt that 
this sentence was too lenient. The Matyityi judgement was an appeal for the charges of murder 
and rape only.324 According the Criminal Law Amendment Act the prescribed sentences for 
each of the crimes of murder and rape is life imprisonment unless there are substantial and 
compelling circumstances. In the judgement of the court a quo of the Matyityi case, the court 
had imposed a prescribed sentence in view of the accused’s age and the remorse the accused had 
displayed during the trial.325  
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Before considering whether these amounted to substantial and compelling circumstances, Judge 
Ponnan expressed his views about what a just sentencing regime would comprise of. Quoting 
from the case of Samuels v The State,326 the judge said that a just penal policy is one that makes a 
consideration of a broad range of sentencing options from which an appropriate option can be 
selected that best fits the unique circumstances of the case before the court.327 He goes on to 
mention that the penal policy should be victim centered, i.e. where the victim is offered a role in 
the sentencing process through being allowed to describe any physical or emotional pain that 
they went through because of the crime as well as any social or economic effects that the crime 
might have had or will have in the future.328 
The Appeal Court noted that the court a quo in imposing their sentence did not understand that 
the starting point wasn’t a clean slate upon which it was free to inscribe whatever sentence it 
though appropriate. The starting point was actually the prescribed sentences in the Act.329 This is 
a point that was emphasized in the Malgas330 case. Malgas clearly states that courts are to 
approach the question of sentencing knowing fully that the legislature had ‘ordained’ the 
prescribed sentences as appropriate for the specific crimes listed. 331 It is evident that Matyityi is 
endorsing Malgas and following the guidelines that it put forward. Matyityi goes on to quote 
paragraph 9 from the Malgas case which emphasizes the point that the prescribed sentences are 
not to be departed from for ‘flimsy’ reasons and that ‘hypotheses favorable to the offender, 
sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy 
or legislation’. 
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The Appeal Court went on to take a closer look at the facts of the case. They noted that the two 
incidences were five days apart, the respondent had been the ringleader in both the incidents, the 
two incidents had been executed with great brutality and the respondent was involved when it 
came to driving the car and all the other necessary things that had to be done for the successful 
completion of the crime.332 The damage done to the victims was also highlighted in an attempt to 
justify that the sentence that had been imposed by the court a quo had not been properly 
considered.333 The judge found that there was nothing that could lessen the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender.334 The two reasons that had been advanced for departing from 
the prescribed minimum sentences were shown to have no factual basis. The judge in the court a 
quo had ignored the gravity of the offence and chose to focus on the personal interests of the 
offender. This was what the legislature was guarding against when it enacted the Act. The Act 
wants a severe, standardized and consistent response from the courts when it comes to serious 
crime. The judge in the court a quo had been motivated by maudlin sympathy and this is not 
sufficient enough to qualify as ‘substantial and compelling’.335 
In paragraph 23, the court in Matyityi further emphasizes what was put forward by the Malgas 
case. It mentions how courts are quick to depart from the prescribed sentences for the flimsiest of 
reasons and how courts despite them having personal doubts as to the efficacy of this legislation, 
should implement those sentences.336 In conclusion, the Appeal Court in Matyityi held that the 
accused’s age and the remorse he had displayed during the trial did not amount to substantial and 
compelling circumstances.337 This decision was arrived at using the method of interpretation that 
was put forward in the Malgas case. The sentence by the court a quo was held to be 
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disproportionate to the crime and the interests of the society.338 The sentence of 25 years was 
therefore substituted to imprisonment for life for both the rape charge and the murder charge.339 
3.3.6 S v Mahlangu 
The case of S v Mahlangu340 involved robbery with aggravating circumstances (which warrants a 
sentence of 15 years), unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition (carry a maximum 
sentence) and murder that is committed in the course of a robbery (warranting life 
imprisonment). In this case, Judge Satchwell was obliged to impose a sentence of 15 years in 
respect of the robbery and life imprisonment on the other charge if substantial and compelling 
circumstances did not exist. 
Satchwell went on to consider the circumstances of the case.  Firstly, he mentioned the ages of 
the accused persons. Accused 1 was 20 years old, accused 2 was 25 years old and accused 3 was 
almost 22 at the time of the commission of the crime.341 The judge remarked that this age group 
is one that the courts usually describe as youthful and people in this age group usually have 
youthfulness taken as a mitigating factor when it comes to sentencing.342 The people in this age 
group are treated more leniently when it comes to sentencing because they are thought to be less 
mature and prone to influence and are sometimes irresponsible.343 Satchwell was however quick 
to say that youthfulness is not an automatic factor when it comes to determining what substantial 
and compelling circumstances are.344 In the present case the youngest one had exercised the most 
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influence.345 The judge also mentioned that youthfulness ceases to be a mitigating factor when it 
is weighed against factors like the gravity of the offence. The gravity of an offence outweighs 
youthfulness.346 
The next factor that was considered was the amount of time the accused persons had spent in 
custody. They had been incarcerated for 1 year 11 months without having been found guilty. 
Accused 1 was however serving a sentence of two years imprisonment for theft so this 
consideration excludes him.347 It was noted that being an incarcerated person is very hard, 
especially for prisoners awaiting trial. Prisoners who are awaiting trial do not receive benefits of 
remission, parole or amnesties.348 Accused 2 and 3 had suffered great hardships while awaiting 
trial and this was a factor that the judge decided to take into account.349 
The third factor was the circumstances under which the accused persons had grown up. Some of 
the parents were in employment and some were not. None of the accused persons had completed 
high school and had had training for any skills.350 They had been doing piece jobs but never had 
enough to take care of themselves or their family.351 The judge remarked that in such 
circumstances there is a great temptation to go for the quicker ways to make money through theft 
and robbery.352 Satchwell then made an important comment that despite this, it was important to 
note that the accused persons had not only committed theft and robbery but they had committed 
murder as well. This was important to bear in mind.353 The second important comment that 
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Judge Satchwell made was that there are a lot of young people that grow up under the same 
circumstances as the accused persons and it’s not all of them that turn to crime as a means of 
survival.354 
The fourth factor that was taken into account was that the murder had been premeditated.355 This 
is an aggravating factor. The final factor Judge Satchwell took into account was that the accused 
persons had each played different roles in the execution of the crime.356 Accused 1 had been the 
leader as he had a lot of information regarding the victims.357  
These were the five factors that Judge Satchwell took into account in order to make a decision 
whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed in this case. After this, she went on to 
consider the Malgas case. It referred to this case as the one that is consulted with regards to any 
matters that involve minimum sentencing legislation.  The following points put forward in the 
Malgas judgment were emphasized in this case358: 
1) The judge mentioned that Malgas held that the reason for enactment of the minimum 
sentencing legislation was so there is a ‘severe, standardized and consistent’ response 
from the courts with regard to crime. 
2) This case emphasized the point put forward in Malgas that the emphasis now has shifted 
to the gravity of the crime  
3) Thirdly, another point from Malgas that was emphasized is that for factors to qualify as 
substantial and compelling there must be truly convincing reasons. 
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4) The judgment in Mahlangu also reiterated that the cumulative impact of all the 
circumstances must be measured against the yardstick of substantial and compelling in 
order to make a determination.359 
 
It is important to note how Judge Satchwell summed up the task before him. In her own words 
 ‘I as the sentencing court, I’m obliged to take into account all the relevant factors and look at their 
combined impact to see whether they are convincing enough to justify a deviation from the prescribed 
minimum sentence’.360  
She then went on to consider the factors. In favor of the accused persons was the fact that they 
were relatively young and two of them had been in custody for a long time. Against them was 
the fact that the crime they had committed was brutal.361 In light of this, Satchwell J concluded 
that there existed no substantial and compelling circumstances in this case. She went on to 
impose life imprisonment for the murder and 15 years in respect of the robbery.  
3.3.7 Buys v S 
In the case of Buys v S362 the appellant had been charged with robbery with aggravating 
circumstances and had pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment 
as prescribed and the regional magistrate court had not found any substantial and compelling 
circumstances.363 The appellant had jumped over a wall, gained access to a guesthouse and had 
held a certain Mrs. E.N with a toy gun (which at that time she believed was a real firearm). The 
                                                          
359 S v Mahlangu at page 8. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
362 (2014) ZAECGHC13 26 March 2014. 







appellant had then proceeded to take several items from the room to the value of R40 000.364 The 
basis of the appeal was that the appellant’s personal circumstances had not been accorded proper 
recognition and this was done by overemphasizing the seriousness of the crime that had been 
committed.365 
The Appeal Court then had to examine the personal circumstances of the accused in order to 
ensure that they had not been underemphasized. The circumstances that existed were that the 
appellant was the youngest of 5 children and had been raised by a single mother. He was also the 
father of a baby boy who lived with his unemployed mother. The appellant did not earn a lot of 
money.366 The defence had also highlighted the fact that the appellant had shown remorse as he 
had pleaded guilty and gave evidence in court to that effect. There was also no real danger during 
the commission of the crime as a toy gun had been used and no person was injured in the process 
except the appellant himself who had been bitten by police dogs.367 In addition, all the goods that 
the appellant had taken from the guest house had been recovered and no damage had been done 
to the property.368 
The Appeal Court went on to evaluate this circumstances. The first thing that was mentioned was 
that the appellant had not been a first offender and had shown no real appreciation of the 
seriousness of the crime that he had committed.369 It was held that the fact that there had been in 
absence of violence when the crime was committed did not amount to a substantial and 
compelling circumstance as it was only due to the fact that Mrs. E.N had cooperated with the 
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appellant’s instructions.370 The Appeal Court highlighted that the appellant had gained access by 
jumping over a wall that had been built for safety. The guests who had lost their possessions 
were highly unlikely to return to the guest house meaning that the business of the owner had 
been significantly affected as a result of the crime the appellant had committed.371 
It was also highlighted that luxury items had been stolen.372 It was also held significant for the 
purposes of sentencing to note that within the period where the appellant had a suspended 
sentence for theft he had committed an armed robbery.373 After analyzing the personal factors, it 
was held that the seriousness of the crime was significant and it outweighed the personal 
circumstances of the accused. 
3.3.8 Mogaramedi v S 
In this case, the appellant had been convicted on a charge of murder in the North Gauteng High 
Court and had been sentenced to life imprisonment.374 The appellant had been a sangoma 10 
years before committing the offence. He had been asked to get the genitals of a close female 
relative as part of his initiation. He lured his young sister and while she was sleeping he hit her 
with an axe twice on the head. He was arrested while in possession of the genital organ.375 
The personal circumstances that had been taken into account by the court a quo were:376 
a) The accused was 49 years old, a first offender and had been working as a security guard 
and had been in custody months prior to the sentencing. 
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b) The accused has three children. 
c) He had been a practicing sangoma for 10 years. 
Despite this, it was held that this case was one of ‘exceptional seriousness’ and the court had to 
send a strong message to the public that such a crime will not be taken lightly.377 The following 
aggravating circumstances were held to warrant the imposition of the prescribed sentence of life 
imprisonment:378 
a) The aim of the offence had been to unlawfully remove the genital organs of the deceased. 
b) The appellant had attacked the deceased while she slept, hitting her twice in the head with 
an axe and stabbing her underneath her left breast until she had died. He then proceeded 
to cut off her genital organ. 
c) The crime was described as a ‘heinous, callous, brutal’ murder against the appellant’s 
own sister, a person who trusted him. It was mentioned that the appellant had shown a 
disregard for human life and the fact that he had carefully planned the crime did not make 
things any better. 
 
3.3.9 Montsho v The State 
In Montsho379 the appellant had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment 
after the court had found that substantial and compelling circumstances were not present.380 The 
appellant had put the deceased on the ground, undressed him and then went on to inflict twelve 
stab wounds with his knife. Afterwards he had thrown the knife away and left the scene leaving 
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the deceased lying helplessly on the ground crying.381 The Appeal court had to make a 
determination on whether the trial court had erred in finding that there were no substantial and 
compelling circumstances warranting a departure from the prescribed sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
The court acknowledged that the starting point when it comes to dealing with the minimum 
sentencing regime is the case of Malgas.382 Counsel of the appellant had put forward the 
following mitigating factors with the view that these were enough to warrant a departure from 
life imprisonment:383 
a) The appellant was 25 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. 
b) The appellant had pleaded guilty to the charge and this showed that he had remorse for 
his actions. 
c) The appellant had one previous conviction of assault. 
d) He had worked as a traditional healer. 
e) He was unmarried. 
f) He had been diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder and was described as 
narcissistic. 
 
The court in Montsho took instructions from Matyityi regarding the question of whether a plea of 
guilty amounts to remorse.384 In Matyityi385 a plea of guilty was held to be a neutral factor and it 
was emphasized that there is a difference between regret and remorse. It was remarked that 
whether or not an accused is remorseful is a factual question that is to be deduced from the 
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actions of the accused and not merely what he/she says in court. The appellant had alleged that 
he did not remember why he had taken the deceased away and this shows that he minimized the 
moral culpability he had and this goes against him being remorseful.386 
On his own version of events the appellant had said that after the murder he had become scared 
and was in fear of how the community would react. This shows that he was more concerned 
about his own wellbeing.387 The factor that was put forward about the appellant being 25 years 
old was struck down on the basis that there was nothing to show that he was an immature 
person.388 Counsel of the appellant conceded that the mitigating factors they had put forward 
were neutral but argued that if viewed cumulatively they could amount to substantial and 
compelling circumstances. The court did not understand how this could be and reiterated 
Malgas389 remarks that sentences should not be departed from for ‘flimsy reasons and 
speculative hypotheses favorable to the offender’.390 
In conclusion, it was found that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances and the 
appeal was dismissed. The murder was described as ‘appalling’, ‘horrific’ and ‘heinous’ and that 
life imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence.391 
3.3.10 S v Ngwenya 
The Ngwenya case involved a charge of robbery with aggravating circumstances. The court a 
quo imposes the prescribed 15 years of imprisonment for the charge.392 Counsel for the appellant 
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argued that the following factors had not been given due weight by the court a quo in deciding 
whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed393: 
a) Appellant was employed and he was the breadwinner of his extended family. 
b) The incarceration would have negative effects on his minor children. 
c) There was no evidence that the appellant would offend again. 
d) The appellant could be rehabilitated through a shorter term of imprisonment. 
 
Counsel for the state argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal should confirm the sentence 
because the personal circumstances of the appellant had been taken into account by the court a 
quo. They also highlighted the following factors:394 
a) The victim had been robbed while a firearm was pointed at their head. 
b) The victim had received threats of death. 
c) At that time the appellant was a member of the South African Police Service and had 
abused his position of trust. 
 
The SCA went on to highlight the seriousness of the crime of robbery and mentioned that the 
fact that it has been listed under the crimes which warrant mandatory minimum sentences shows 
that the parliament views it as a very serious crime.395 The fact that the appellant was a member 
of the SAPS did not work in his favor. The SCA highlighted that it is a societal need that police 
officers who take advantage of members of the public be removed from the society. It was also 
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highlighted that they must be taught a lesson in order to deter other police officers from 
committing similar crimes.396 
After taking into account the personal circumstances of the appellant the SCA found that there 
were no substantial and compelling circumstances in this case and went on to impose the 
prescribed sentence of 15 years.397   
3.3.11 S v Matjeke 
In Matjeke the accused was convicted of premeditated murder and robbery with aggravating 
circumstances.398 Judge Ratshibvumo made remarks that when it comes to sentencing under 
minimum Sentence legislation, the approach has now become well developed.399 The following 
points made in the Malgas case where emphasized: 
a) The courts must approach crimes with prescribed sentences conscious of the fact that the 
legislature has ordained life imprisonment for those crimes. 
b) The prescribed sentences should not be departed from for ‘light flimsy’ reasons.400 
c) The cumulative impact of all the factors must be measured against the yardstick of 
‘substantial and compelling’ to see if a departure is warranted.401 
d) The ‘proportionality’ element was emphasized using the Vilakazi case.402 
 
These were the points that this case emphasized from the Malgas case. Judge Ratshibvumo went 
on to list the following factors which he held to be substantial and compelling in this case:403 
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a) Accused had consumed alcohol which had influenced him. 
b) His motor vehicle had been shot at and two of his passengers had been struck with 
bullets. 
c) The accused had surrendered himself to the police and had not concealed the fact that he 
was a driver. 
d) The prescribed sentences are disproportionate to the offender, the crime and the 













                                                                                                                                                                                           








A discussion of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines and a comparison with South Africa’s 
mandatory minimum sentencing regime. 
4.1 Introduction. 
As can be seen from the previous chapters, there are problems with consistency in interpreting 
the provisions in the Act. This chapter will discuss the sentencing guidelines of the state of 
Minnesota in the United States of America to establish whether the South African sentencing 
system can adopt some solutions to the problem of interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’. The 
term ‘substantial and compelling’ is said to have been taken from the Minnesota guidelines. Van 
Zyl Smit mentions that this term is not found in South African law but it appears to have been 
taken from modern American sentencing practices.404 
Since the year 1994 there were problems with the sentencing system (as discussed in Chapter 1). 
One of the responses from the government regarding these sentencing problems was asking the 
South African Law Commission to investigate and find proper solutions. It was then that a 
committee under the leadership of Leonora Van der Heever was appointed.405 The committee 
was opposed to the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences but it decided to launch an 
investigation into the matter.406 To aid in the investigation, it developed an issue paper which 
was open to public comment and one of the options for reform in that issue paper was the 
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enactment of sentencing guidelines with the Minnesota sentencing guidelines in the USA cited as 
the best example.407  It is for this reason that this Chapter will look at these guidelines. 
After the Sentencing Guidelines are discussed, there will be a comparison with the South African 
Mandatory Minimum sentencing laws. Minnesota is of great importance as it is said that the 
phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ was probably adopted from its sentencing guidelines.408 
Finally, the criticisms that have been labelled against the Minnesota guidelines and South 
Africa’s mandatory minimum sentencing regime will be discussed. 
4.2 The historical development of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. 
In May 1980, the state of Minnesota was the first American states to put into effect a sentencing 
system that includes the use of sentencing guidelines.409 In the early 1970’s there had been an 
‘indeterminate’ scheme that was in place.410 The sentences were not fixed but they were in wide 
ranges such as ‘15-25years’.411 As a result, there were a lot of sentencing disparities that existed 
in the system.412 It was because of this that an independent sentencing commission was tasked to 
come up with binding sentencing guidelines. The policy makers wanted sentences that were 
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uniform and predictable. Legislators also felt that the parole board was disregarding the 
seriousness of certain offences by releasing offenders sooner than expected.413 
The Commission that was established comprises of eleven members that are appointed by the 
governor. The members include:414 
a) a state supreme court justice 
b) two trial court judges 
c) prosecuting attorney 
d) defense attorney 
e) commissioner of corrections 
f) parole board chair  
g) 3 citizen members one of which must be the victim of a crime. 
 
The Commission decided to adopt a grid system as part of the sentencing guidelines. The 
decision to adopt the grid or matrix that is used in the Minnesota guidelines was influenced by a 
variety of factors. It was influenced by existing federal and state parole guidelines, previous 
experiments that had been done with voluntary sentencing guidelines and the statutory directives 
that had been given to the commission when they were drafting the guidelines. The directives 
were that the recommended sentences had to be based on ‘reasonable offence and offender 
characteristics’ and they had to take consideration of existing sentencing practices.415 
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The Commission’s research found that when it comes to sentencing the two most influential 
factors when it came to determining a sentence are the offender’s criminal history score and the 
type of offence they committed.416 
4.3 The Guidelines. 
The Sentencing Guidelines in the state of Minnesota embody the following principles:417 
● Sentencing must be neutral to race, age, social or economic status, and gender of an 
offender. 
● The severity of a sentence should increase in proportion to offence severity or the 
offender's’ history or both. 
● Commitment to Commissioner of Corrections is the most severe sanction but it is not the 
only severe option that is available to the courts. 
● To avoid prison overcrowding, confinement should only be for those offenders who are 
convicted of serious offences or those who have long criminal histories. 
● Although the guidelines are advisory, the presumptive sentences have been deemed 
appropriate and departure from them should only be done when there are ‘substantial and 
compelling’ circumstances that can be identified and put on record. 
The Sentencing Guidelines consist of two types of sentences which are: 
● Presumptive Sentences418 - These are the sentences that are found on what are called 
grids. They are named ‘presumptive’ because they are presumed to be appropriate for 
certain offences that share the same type of severity and certain characteristics. 
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● Mandatory Minimum Sentences419- These are minimum executed420 sentences. Their 
durations are specified in the statutes for offenders who have been convicted of certain 
felony421 offences. 
 
4.4 THE PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES 
4.4.1 The grid/Matrix 
 The Minnesota guidelines are characterized by a grid or a matrix. The ‘presumptive’ sentence is 
found in the appropriate grid (there are different grids for crimes) located at the intersection of 
the criminal history score and the severity level.422 Severity of offence and criminal history score 
are the two dimensions that are most important for sentencing in the state of Minnesota.423 
1) Severity Level 
The general rule is that the applicable offence severity level is determined by the conviction 
offence.424 There exists an Offense Severity Reference Table and the severity level for each 
felony offence is found in section 5A.425 There is no severity level for first degree murder 
because by law the crime is punishable by a mandatory life sentence.426 There are some offences 
that are unranked when it comes to severity levels. In such a case, the court must assign a 
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severity level and specify on record why they chose that particular severity level.427 The factors 
that a court may consider in doing this are as follows (this is not an exhaustive list)428: 
a) Gravity of the conduct done in the unranked offence. 
b) the severity level that is assigned to any offence with similar elements to that particular 
unranked offence 
c) The conduct of and severity level assigned to offenders who have committed a similar 
offence. 
d) Severity level assigned to other offenders engaged in similar conduct. 
    2) Criminal History 
The horizontal axis on the Sentencing Guidelines grids is the criminal history.429An offender’s 
criminal history is the total of points from the following:430 
a) prior felonies 
b) custody status at time of offence 
c) prior misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors 
d) prior juvenile adjudication 
   3) Finding the presumptive sentence 
The question that now arises is how a presumptive sentence is found using the grid/matrix. The 
Presumptive sentence is found in the appropriate cell on the applicable grid for a particular 
offence.431 It is found where the criminal history score (on the horizontal axis) meets the severity 
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level which is on the vertical axis. The grid/matrix has shaded and unshaded areas. For the cases 
contained in the shaded areas it means the sentence should be stayed432 unless the conviction 
carries a mandatory minimum sentence. In the unshaded areas it means the sentence should be 
executed.433 
 The presumptive sentence lengths are shown in months and the commission’s intention was that 
they be calculated with reference to calendar months.434 In instances where the presumptive 
sentence length is more than the statutory maximum sentence, the statutory maximum sentence 
becomes the presumptive sentence.435 
The presumptive sentences came into constitutional trouble in the case of Apprendi v New 
Jersey.436 It was indicated that some of the aspects involved in the presumptive guidelines 
infringe on the right of a defendant to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States.437 
4.4.2 Departure from the Guidelines 
This is a very important part of the Sentencing Guidelines of the state of Minnesota (in relation 
to the topic). The sentences that are provided in the grids are the sentences that must be imposed 
for the specific crimes that are stipulated there. The courts must impose the sentence ‘of the 
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applicable disposition and within the applicable range’ unless there exists ‘identifiable 
substantial and compelling circumstances.’438 
 It is important to note that the words ‘substantial and compelling’ are also used by the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act of South Africa. A judge can only depart from the prescribed mandatory 
minimum sentences if there are substantial and compelling circumstances warranting a departure. 
It is also important to note that these departures are not controlled by the guidelines. The 
departure in itself is an exercise of judicial discretion.439 When departing from the presumed 
sentence, the court must in writing, state the particular substantial and compelling circumstances 
that make the departure more appropriate than the sentence in the grid.440 'These reasons must be 
stated in the sentencing order and included in the departure report and filed with the 
Commission’.441 The Criminal Law Amendment Act in South Africa does also stipulate that the 
substantial and compelling circumstances must be entered on record. 
This departure report has to be filed within 15 days after sentencing and it has to be filed with the 
Commission.442 The defendant in question has rights to a jury trial determining whether the 
aggravating factors considered have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.443 If the departure 
facts i.e. the facts that are depended upon by the judge in question to depart from the 
presumptive sentence, are proved beyond a reasonable doubt the court may exercise its discretion 
to depart.444 The reasons that support the departure including all the aggravating and mitigating 
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factors must be substantial and compelling to overcome the presumption in favor of the 
guidelines sentence.  
It is said that the purposes of these guidelines will be undermined if the presumptive sentences 
are departed from on a regular basis. The aim of reducing sentencing disparity will also not be 
achieved.445 This was the same comment that was made in the Malgas case. In South African law 
Malgas guides the courts not to depart from the mandatory minimum sentences for flimsy 
reasons as this would undermine what the legislature intended as discussed in Chapter 2. 
4.4.3 Factors that should not be used as reasons for departure 
Perhaps the most interesting part about the sentencing guidelines of Minnesota is that they 
stipulate the factors that should not be used as reasons to depart from the presumptive sentences. 
This means that these factors are not regarded as substantial and compelling and if any of them 
are present, the sentence that is deemed by law as appropriate is the one that must be imposed in 
that case. The following factors are not to be regarded as reasons for departure in the state of 
Minnesota: 
a) A person’s race 
b) Employment factors including 
1) Occupation or impact of sentence on profession 
2) Employment history 
3) Employment at the time of offence or sentence 
c) Social factors including 
1) Educational attainment 
2) Living arrangements at the time of offence or sentencing 
                                                          







3) Length of residence 
4) Marital status 
5) Defendant's exercise of constitutional rights during the adjudication process. 
 
The Commission took the position that sentencing is neutral with respect to an offender’s sex, 
race and the amount of money one earns. This is why employment factors are listed as these are 
related to the sex, race and income level. The Commission also took the position that 
employment is a factor that can be manipulated hence it is listed. There is a chance that offenders 
can obtain employment during the time between arrest and sentence as an attempt to reduce the 
severity of their sentences.446 
4.4.4 Factors that may be used as reasons for departure 
Factors that can be used to depart from the sentences are also given in the guidelines. This list of 
factors is non- exhaustive.  It includes the following factors447: 
4.4.4.1Mitigating factors 
a) Where the victim was an aggressor in the incident. 
b) Where the offender played a minor or passive role in the crime or participated under the 
circumstances of coercion or duress 
c) Where the offender lacked the substantial capacity to completely judge the situation. The 
voluntary consumption of intoxicants like drugs or alcohol does not fall under this 
category. 
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d) Offender's presumptive sentence is a commitment but not a mandatory minimum 
sentence and there is existence of either of the following: 
● Where the current conviction offence is a severity level 1 or 2 and the offender 
received all of his/her prior sentences during less than 3 separate appearances in 
court. 
● Where the current conviction is at severity level 3 or severity level 4 and the 
offender has received all of his/her prior felony sentences during one court 
appearance. 
 
e) Other grounds exist that reduce the offender’s culpability even though these grounds do not 
amount to a defence. 
f) Where the offender has a serious persistent mental illness and the court is ordering alternative 
placement. 
g) Where the offender can be put on probation. This factor can but need not be supported by the 
fact that offender is open to join a certain program of individualized treatment. 
h) In the case of a controlled substance, where the offender is found by the district court to be 
chemically dependent and if they have been accepted by or can respond to a treatment program. 
4.4.4.2 Aggravating Factors448 
a) The victim was particularly vulnerable because of his/her age, reduced physical or mental 
capacity and offender knew or should have known. 
b) Where a victim is treated with cruelty for which the offender is responsible. 
                                                          







c) Where the conviction is for a criminal sexual offence or an offence where the victim was 
injured and the offender has a prior conviction for criminal sexual conduct or an offence 
in which the victim was injured. 
d) If the offence was a major economic offence. The presence of the following factors will 
aggravate it: 
● Where the offence involved a lot of victims or a lot of incidents per person. 
● Where the offence involved an attempted monetary loss greater than the usual offence   
or greater than the minimum loss specified in the statutes. 
● Where the offence was sophisticated and planning of it happened over a long period of 
time. 
● Where the defendant used his/her statues to facilitate the commission of the offence. 
● Where defendant has been involved in other conduct similar to the offence. 
      e) If the offence involved a controlled substance. The presence of these factors will aggravate  
           It: 
● If the offence involved three or more separate transactions where the substance was sold 
or transferred to another person with the intention to sell. 
● Where the offender or the accomplice had equipment or monies showing that the offence 
was committed as part of a wholesale or trafficking of a controlled substance. 
● Where the offence involved the manufacture of the controlled substance. 
● Where the offender or the accomplice had a firearm or any other dangerous weapon. 
● Where the circumstances show that the offender had a high position in the drug 
distribution hierarchy. 
● Where the offence involved a high degree of sophistication and execution and planning 







● Where the offender used his position to facilitate with the commission of the crime. 
● Where the offence involved separate acts of sale or possession of the controlled substance 
in three or more counties. 
● Where the offender has a prior conviction that involves violence or the sale of a 
controlled substance. 
● Where the defendant or the accomplice manufactured, possessed or sold the controlled 
substance in certain areas. 
f) Where the offender committed the crime for hire, a crime against the person. 
g) Where the offender is being sentenced as a dangerous offender. 
h) Where offender is being sentenced as a career offender. 
i) Where the offender committed the offence as part of a group of three or more offenders. 
j) Where the offender selects the victim based on sex, age gender, sexual orientation, disability or 
national origin. 
k) Where the offence was committed in the presence of a child. 
l) Where the offence was committed in a location where the victim expected some privacy. 
These factors are not exhaustive. In the comment section of the Minnesota guidelines they are 
described as ‘illustrative’.449 The factors are meant to describe specific situations that involve a 
small number of cases that the courts encounter.450 It is interesting to note that some of these 
factors may be considered when establishing conditions of stayed sentences without necessarily 
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being used as points of departure.451 General factors such as intoxication at the time of offence 
are rejected by the Commission.452 
4.5 THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES. 
In the Minnesota Guidelines, there are certain offences that are subject to mandatory minimum 
sentences. Even if an offender would otherwise receive a presumptive stayed sentence under the 
guidelines, if an offence is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence the presumptive 
disposition is always commitment. The duration of the commitment will be stipulated in the 
statutes.453 
4.5.1 Departure from the Mandatory Minimum Sentences. 
The court on its own or on the prosecutor’s motion may impose a sentence other than the 
prescribed mandatory minimum sentence if the court finds that substantial and compelling 
reasons to do so exist.454 There are two types of departures455 which are 
● Dispositional Departure - a stay of imposition or a stay of execution is a dispositional 
departure. A stay of execution is where the courts accepts and records a finding or plea of 
guilty and then the prison sentence is pronounced but not executed.456 A stay of 
imposition is where the court accepts or records a finding or a plea of guilty but does not 
impose a prison sentence.457 
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● Durational Departure - This is a sentence other than the mandatory minimum or the 
presumptive duration or applicable range in grid, whichever is longer. 
 
4.6 COMPARISON BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA’S MANDATORY MINIMUM 
SENTENCING SYSTEM AND MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES. 
4.6.1 South Africa’s Mandatory Minimum sentencing legislation. 
In order to successfully compare the two systems there is need to discuss the mandatory 
minimum sentencing legislation in South Africa as well. These mandatory minimum sentencing 
laws can be found in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.458 This act lists certain 
offences that are regarded as serious and it identifies situations in which mandatory minimum 
sentences must be imposed. The act further states that these sentences can be departed from if 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances exist in a particular case.459 
4.6.2 Structure of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 
Section 51 of the Act prescribed the minimum terms of imprisonment, mainly the offences that 
attract public concern and are committed in circumstances where the offender is blameworthy.460 
The offences are listed under Parts of Schedule 2 of the Act. In Part 1 the following are listed:461 
a) Murder 
b) Rape 
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c) compelled rape 
d) any offence that is referred to in certain sections of the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist Related Activity Act when certain circumstances in 
Schedule 2 exist 
e) Offence of trafficking in persons for sexual purposes in terms of Section 71(1) or (2) of 
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act of 2007. 
Part 2 includes:462 
a) Murder (in circumstances other than those listed in Part 1). 
b) robbery on specified circumstances 
c) Any offence relating to drugs and drug trafficking. 
Part 3 includes:463 
a) rape or compelled rape as contemplated in Section 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act in circumstances other than those 
mentioned in Part 1. 
b) Sexual exploitation of a child or mentally ill person 
c) Using child pornography or a child or mentally ill person for purposes of pornography. 
d) Assault with the intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm. 
e) Offence in contravention of section 36 of the Arms and Ammunition act. 
f) Any offence that is related to trafficking by a commercial carrier as contemplated in 
Section 71(6) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act. 
Part 4 includes:464 
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a) Where the accused person was in possession of a firearm which was intended to be used 
in the commission of the offence. 
b) Treason 
c) Sedition 
d) Public Violence 
e) Robbery other than the type listed in Part 1, 2 
f) Kidnapping 
g) Any offence involving assault 
h) An offence where a dangerous wound is inflicted with a firearm (other than those 
offences listed in Part1,2,3) 
i) An offence that involves breaking, entering a premise with the intent of committing an 
offence. 
j) Escaping from lawful custody 
 
These are the crimes that fall under mandatory minimum sentencing laws. The act now goes on 
to the prescription of the sentences and this starts with Section 51(1). Section 51(1) applies to the 
offences that are listed in Part 1 of the Schedules and it imposes a duty on the courts to impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment on those crimes.465 Section 51(2) applies to the crimes that are 
listed in Part 2 to Part A and places a duty on the courts to impose minimum terms of 
imprisonment that prescribed. Subsection 3 contains the exception which stipulates that courts 
can depart from the prescribed sentences if they find that ‘substantial and compelling’ 
circumstances exist. This phrase made the act withstand constitutional scrutiny as it maintains 
the discretion of the courts in deciding which sentence to impose. 
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4.6.3 Procedural requirements. 
There are also procedural requirements that go together with the act. If the court in question fails 
to inform the accused that the crime they have been charged with falls under the ambit of the act 
and then go on to prescribe a sentence, that sentence will be set aside. This can be seen in the 
case of S v Rapoo466 where three accused persons were convicted of armed robbery and 
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The issue in this case was whether there was a duty on the 
magistrate’s court to inform the accused persons of the provisions of section 51. It was held that 
it was the magistrates’ court duty to do so and failure to do so had infringed on the accused 
person's’ right to a fair trial. The sentences were therefore set aside. 
Another procedural requirement that exists is the split procedure.467 This is where if an offence 
falls under the ambit of Part 1 of schedule 2 and there has been a plea of guilty or not guilty by 
the accused. If the punishment the offence warrants is in excess of the jurisdiction of the high 
court, the court shall stop the proceedings and commit the accused for sentence by a High Court 
with jurisdiction. 
4.6.4 CRITICISMS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES. 
 
There has also been criticism that has been levelled against South Africa’s mandatory minimum 
sentencing regime. According to Terblanche, criticism of the Act can be divided into disapproval 
of the act itself, attacks on its poor language and the difficulty that the courts have experienced in 
trying to determine what intention the legislature had.468 He is of the view that some of the 
difficulties could initially be excused since the Act was not meant to be permanent at the time 
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that it was enacted, but now that it has become permanent it is difficult to overlook these 
difficulties.469 
4.6.4.1 No reduced crime and the sentencing disparities have worsened. 
Critics submit that the mandatory minimum sentences have not reduced or deterred crime or the 
disparities that existed within the sentencing system.470 These were the problems that mandatory 
minimum sentences were meant to address when they were enacted. It is of great concern if these 
goals are not being achieved. It is also very difficult to find any evidence that the sentencing 
regime has had a deterrent effect or reduced crime in any way. Crime has risen since the laws 
were enacted and critics argue that the sentencing disparities still exist.471 
It has been argued that increasing sentencing severity does not have a deterrent effect when it 
comes to crime.472 This argument has also been mentioned in relation to other mandatory 
minimum sentencing regimes outside of South Africa. Michael Tonry in the American context 
mentions that there is clear evidence that the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences has no 
deterrent effect and if any, the deterrent effect is insignificant.473 In his assessments of mandatory 
minimum sentences he makes the following comment:474 
“The evidence is clear and weighty, that enactment of mandatory penalty laws has either no 
deterrent effect or a modest deterrent effect that soon wastes away. Equally clear and consistent 
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are findings that mandatory minimum laws provoke judicial and prosecutorial stratagems, usually 
by accepting guilty pleas to other non-mandatory penalty offences or by diverting offenders from 
prosecution altogether that avoid their application.” 
In a more recent comment, Tonry explains that:475 
“No matter which body of evidence is consulted, the general literature on the deterrent effects of 
criminal sanctions, work more narrowly focused on the marginal deterrence hypothesis, or the 
evaluation literature on mandatory penalties the conclusion is the same. There is little basis for 
believing that mandatory penalties have any significant effects on rates of serious crime” 
The same can be said about the South African system as there has been no evidence of a 
consistent drop in crime levels.476 According to R Ellickson, there is a five level model of social 
control which is as follows:477 
a) First party control 
b) Second party control 
c) Social controls 
d) Organizational controls 
e) Government controls 
This shows that government control is one of the many factors that contribute to the control of 
how people will behave. The argument is that severe sentences on their own cannot have a 
deterrent effect on individuals. Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane478 expresses that the true 
deterrent to crime is the ‘likelihood that offenders will be apprehended, convicted and punished’ 
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The continued sentencing disparities are said to have been caused by the inclusion of the phrase 
‘substantial and compelling’. The opportunity to depart from the prescribed sentences using this 
phrase is said to have worsened the disparities.479 This is mainly being caused by the 
parliament’s failure to define the phrase and also the inability by the courts to interpret it in one 
uniform way.480 
4.6.4.2 There is still dissatisfaction with criminal sentencing. 
Critics also argue that the persons in the judicial and criminal justice systems are not satisfied 
with the mandatory minimum sentencing regime. As a result, they try and ‘circumvent’ the 
system and undermine it.481 It is argued that neither the South African communities nor the 
judges have accepted mandatory minimum sentences.482 Those who support the mandatory 
minimum sentences are not satisfied with how the courts are interpreting them in practice.483 
Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers argue that it is difficult to determine whether the legislation has 
addressed the issue of how the public view sentences but survey data reveals that public fear of 
crime which is connected to how the public views the legislature has increased significantly over 
the five years.484 
                                                          
479  J Sloth-Nielsen, L Ehlers “Mandatory and Minimum Sentences in South Africa: Assessing the impact” (2005) 
2005 SA Crime Quarterly 12. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Ibid 14-17. 
482 South African  Law Commission Discussion Paper 91 Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) 2000 
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp91.pdf accessed on 16 September 2017 at xviii-xx 
483 S Roth “South African Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Reform Required” (2008) Minnesota Journal of 
International Law available at http://lawweb3.law.umn.edu/uploads/gV/8l/gV8lyrhMXKzaPTdE5enYZg/Roth-
Final-Online-PDF-04.07.0 171. 
484 J Sloth-Nielsen, L Ehlers “Mandatory and Minimum Sentences in South Africa: Assessing the impact” (2005) 







4.6.4.3 Mandatory Minimum Sentences have caused prison overcrowding. 
The mandatory minimum sentences are said to have increased the prison population. This has 
been an indirect effect that has occurred and is being caused mainly by the mandatory life 
sentences and the parole reform provisions that require a convict to serve at least eighty percent 
of their sentence.485 Terblanche remarks that the Act was enacted with no consideration 
whatsoever of the effect that it was going to have on the prison population.486Judge Fagan the 
inspecting judge of prisons suggested that the sentencing regime contributes heavily to prison 
overcrowding.487 He asserts further that the numbers of prisoners continues to rise and with a 
growth rate of over 7000 prisoners a year the prison conditions will become inhumane and there 
will be need for mass releases periodically.488 The extent of this problem has not yet been fully 
realized however, it is argued that mandatory minimum sentences will have a huge impact on 
prison population in the future if the sentencing regime is not altered.489 
The implementation of minimum sentences resulted in an increase in the number of prisoners 
that are serving life imprisonment in the prisons. In 1995 there was a number of 400 prisoners 
serving life imprisonment and in March 2008 that figure had climbed to over 8000.490 According 
to the Department of Correctional Services annual report South Africa’s prison population of 
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sentenced inmates stood at 116 951. This was an increase from the previous year, 2015 where the 
population of sentenced offenders in the prisons was 115 064.491 
Imprisoning offenders for a long time can be pointless as research done in the United States and 
the United Kingdom has shown that the persistent offenders reach their crime peak in their late 
teens and late twenties.492 This means that people who are not dangerous can end up being 
imprisoned for a long time and offenders may end up being imprisoned at an age where their 
imprisonment will have no effect in reducing crime. 
4.6.4.4 Mandatory Minimum Sentences are broad and poorly defined. 
The way the law relating to mandatory minimum sentencing is drafted has also sparked criticism. 
It is argued that the act makes little distinction for example between a robber who shoots a 
shopkeeper and a woman who shoots her abusive partner as both of them have to be sentenced to 
life in this case in the event that substantial and compelling circumstances are not found.493 It has 
also been argued that there is no logic in the terms of imprisonment that have been prescribed. 
Life imprisonment is prescribed for some forms of aggravated murder but the two most 
important aggravating factors namely the brutality of the attacks and the vulnerability of the 
victim are left out.494 Another example given to show that the Act lacks internal logic are the 
various amounts of money that limit whether the Act applies or not that are listed in Part II. 
These amounts are described by Terblanche as ‘completely arbitrary’.495 
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This poor drafting has been criticized many times by judicial officers.496 The mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws have been described as ‘covering the field of serious crime in no more 
than a handful of blunt paragraphs’497. In the case of S v RO498 the mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws were said to be providing ‘draconian sanctions’ for the crimes that are listed. 
The difficulties with the act have been in some instances caused by the courts. In the Mofokeng 
case, the court complains of the ‘arbitrary and severe minimum sentences’ but goes on to 
interpret ‘substantial and compelling’ very strictly, restricting it to mean only exceptional 
circumstances.499 
Terblanche makes remarks that people should not view the act as anything but an expensive tool 
when it comes to sentencing. He mentions that the act has resulted in so many hours being used 
by judicial officers trying to figure out what it means and that the act has created a false sense of 
security and a false sense of something that will be effective against the high crime rates.500 
4.6.5 ACHIEVEMENTS BY SOUTH AFRICA’S MANDATORY MINIMUM 
SENTENCING REGIME. 
There has been a decrease in violent crime according to other researches. Although the crime 
levels began to get steady in 2000/2001 dipping in 2001/2002 and rising again in 2002/2003 an 
analysis per crime category has shown that murder has decreased as a result of the mandatory 
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minimum sentences.501 Altbeker notes that between 1996 and 1997 and 2003 and 2004 the 
occurrence of murder per 100 000 of the population decreased from 62.8 to 42.7. The 
continuation of the decline of murder from 1994 onwards shows that the abolition of the death 
penalty in 1995 did not in any way contribute to an increase in the offence.502 
One of the main criticisms against the mandatory minimum sentences has been that it has led to 
prison overcrowding. Critics of this theory argue that it cannot be conclusively shown that the 
increase in the prison population has been due to the enactment of the mandatory minimum 
sentences. They argue that it could be due to a general increase in crime or a more strict 
approach being adopted by judicial officers as well as better policing of serious offences.503 The 
impact of increased jurisdiction of the lower courts could also be one of the factors that have led 
to prison overcrowding. The maximum sentence that a regional court could impose was 
increased from 10 years to 15 years for example.504 Another possible cause of prison 
overcrowding could be the impact of SAPS’s National crime combating strategy which focused 
on selected crime areas with the high crime levels and directed police resources to those areas in 
the form of high density search and seizure operations.505 The split procedure506 also caused a 
delay for prisoners who were awaiting trial as their records were typed and dates sought. If this is 
the case it can be said that mandatory minimum sentences are not to blame for the sudden 
increase in prison population and could still be playing a huge role in addressing the problems 
that led to their enactment. 
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4.7 The Minnesota Guidelines. 
4.7.1 CRITICISMS AGAINST MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES. 
In the United States of America there has been general criticisms levelled against sentencing 
guidelines. Proponents of sentencing guidelines put forward the argument that sentencing 
guidelines are beneficial to any sentencing system. This is based on their belief that sentencing 
guidelines reduce disparities, they make punishments harsher and also serve as a deterrent factor 
when it comes to the commission of crime.507 Another argument is that sentencing guidelines 
help reduce the stress that judges normally had to face without them. Prior the guidelines the 
judges had to wrestle with their emotions before arriving at a particular sentence. Proponents of 
the guidelines argue that this is no longer the case. 
Against this are the critics of sentencing guidelines. They have also put forward arguments 
suggesting that these guidelines might not be the best way to deal with problems that arise in 
sentencing and that they have even made the problems worse. Arguments against sentencing 
guidelines are along the lines of how prosecutors have been given too much power as a result of 
the guidelines. They argue that discretion has been stripped away from the judges because it is a 
criminal charge that determines what sentence an accused person is going to get. Therefore, 
prosecutorial discretion has replaced judicial discretion.508 Another criticism involves the 
mathematical formulas that are used in calculating for example the criminal history scores. It is 
argued that this reduces a human being to a number of points on a sentencing grid worksheet and 
as a result forces the judges to ignore the particular circumstances of the case.509 
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4.7.2 ACHIEVEMENTS BY THE MINNESOTA GUIDELINES.  
Despite the criticisms against the Minnesota sentencing guidelines, some researchers have 
highlighted the successes of the sentencing guidelines. Morley J argues that the sentencing 
guidelines have brought with them an era of fairer sentences and also manageable prison 
capacities.510 This was the solution to their indeterminate sentencing policy that existed before 
the guidelines were enacted. He puts forward that the fairness has been achieved by establishing 
equity both within and between the groups and that allowing for judicial departure creates an 
even stronger uniformity in the imposition of sentences. He also puts forward that viewing the 
correlation between sanction severity and the seriousness of the offence has also led to fairness. 
Morley J also argues that through legislation mandate, there has been a success in alleviating 
prison capacity as well.511 
Prior to the sentencing guidelines there had been broad penalty ranges from the legislature, there 
were also problems with the release policy that was being used by the parole board and decisions 
regarding incarceration were completely dependent on judicial decisions.512 This means there 
was a need for a rational framework that enabled effective and consistent decision making. 
Dailey argues that even though political and practical forces continue to amend these guidelines 
yearly, the guidelines themselves have provided a framework that was essential and is rational 
for efficient decision making when it comes to sentencing. He highlights this as one of the 
successes of the Minnesota guidelines. 
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Statistics play a major role when highlighting the successes of any sentencing policy. Goodstein 
argues that the sentencing guidelines have led to higher equity and more predictable release date. 
This is done by highlighting the statistics from the era when the guidelines did not exist (up to 
the year 1983)513 
One of the successes that has been mentioned is that the sentencing guidelines have reduced the 
sentencing disparity that existed. Knapp puts forward research to support this assertion. Based on 
her findings, she remarks that overall, state uniformity when it comes to imprisonment practices 
has increased under the guidelines. Proportionality (which entails the imposition of severe 
sentences for severe crimes and on serious offenders) of sentences also seems to be occurring 
under the sentencing guidelines according to her findings.514 
The point on alleviation on prison capacity is expanded by Fraser. Fraser uses statistics by 
offering number evaluations that compare the Minnesota sentencing guidelines to other states 
that have a similar system. These comparisons highlight the effectives of the Minnesota 
guidelines in dealing with the issue of prison capacity. 
5. The Comparison. 
a) The starting point when it comes to comparing these two systems will be to look at the 
intention that was had when they were enacted. With the Minnesota guidelines, it is 
stated at the beginning515 before the system is explained that the intention was to make 
sentencing neutral to factors such as race e.tc. Another principle the guidelines embody is 
that the sentences have to be proportional to the crime that has been committed and the 
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criminal history of the offender. Prison overcrowding was also one of the things that the 
guidelines aimed to address. In South Africa on the other hand, with the Criminal 
Amendment Act, the intention was to address the crime levels that had arisen after 1994 
and also to restore the faith of the public in the justice system. Malgas516 sums this up 
perfectly by saying that the intention with this Act was to standardize the response of the 
courts to crime, to make sentences more severe as they were perceived to be too lenient 
and also to achieve consistency in sentencing. 
While there are some similarities with regards to what the two systems aimed to achieve at 
inception, there are also differences. Addressing prison overcrowding was not at the forefront of 
what the Criminal Law Amendment Act wanted to achieve in South Africa. At the forefront it 
seems was the issue to address the prevalence of crime and to ensure a standardized response by 
the courts. In Minnesota however, prison overcrowding was one of the factors. Despite this, the 
similarity is that both systems wanted to achieve a consistent response to crime. 
b) In the Minnesota sentencing guidelines there are two types of sentences that are referred 
to. They refer to presumptive sentences and mandatory sentences. The presumptive 
sentences being the ones that are found on the relevant grids and the mandatory sentences 
being the ones that are prescribed in the statutes. In the South African systems, the 
sentences are referred to as mandatory minimum sentences and no presumptive sentences 
exist. 
c) The presumptive sentences in the Minnesota guidelines are characterized by a grid. In the 
South African system, the act contains all the sentences prescribed for the various crimes. 
With the presumptive sentences, the criminal history score and the severity of the offence 
is used to calculate a sentence that will apply for a specific offence on the grid while in 
                                                          







the South African system, the act lists the crimes in detail, including modifications and 
prescribes a sentence. Severity of an offence or criminal history is something that is 
considered by the court as the traditional factors to be taken account but this is not used 
entirely to determine a sentence that is applicable. The two systems become similar when 
it comes to the mandatory minimum sentences, these are also prescribed by statute in 
Minnesota like they are in South Africa. 
d) Importantly, the sentencing guidelines of Minnesota have a non-exhaustive list of what 
constitutes substantial and compelling and the factors that should not be taken into 
account. In South Africa there was no guidance from the legislature on what constitutes 
substantial and compelling and what doesn’t. The discretion was solely left to the courts. 
Perhaps this had positive sides to it because it was because of this and other factors that 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act managed to withstand the constitutional scrutiny that 
it went through. Factors such as race and other employment factors are not considered as 
substantial and compelling in the American context. In instances where the victim was an 
aggressor or the offender’s culpability can be reduced because of other grounds, these can 
be taken to be substantial and compelling circumstances warranting a departure. The only 
guidance that exists within the South African context is the Malgas case, which listed 
certain principles that all the courts must take into account when approached with the 
problem of minimum sentencing. There also exists guidance that is specific to rape cases 
in the form of the Criminal Law Sentencing Amendment Act. 
After comparing the systems and highlighting the differences that exist between them it will be 
also important to look at the criticisms that have been levelled against them ever since their 







6. CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
In this chapter Minnesota's sentencing guidelines have been unpacked and compared to South 
Africa’s mandatory minimum sentencing regime. The findings reflect that both systems came 
into existence for more or less the same reasons of wanting to address sentencing disparities and 
providing deterrence which is meant to reduce crime levels. Although South Africa was 
influenced by the Minnesota state sentencing guidelines, there is no confirmed list of what 
constitutes ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances as was done in Minnesota. Both of the 
systems have faced criticism and research is showing that there have had little or insignificant 
impact since their enactment. There is mere certainty in Minnesota as there is a list of what 
















Summary of findings, Analysis of the cases, Discussion of problems, Recommendations and 
Conclusions to the study. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As previously stated, the purpose of the dissertation was to look at the interpretations being given 
by the courts of the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ in order to establish whether the case of 
Malgas517 has led to one consistent way of interpretation. This is important as there is a necessity 
to establish whether the intention of the legislature is being fulfilled. Another intention of the 
study was to explore the Minnesota sentencing guidelines where the phrase ‘substantial and 
compelling’ was probably adopted from in order to make a comparison and examine if South 
Africa can adopt the same structure to deal with the problems of interpretation of the clause that 
currently exist.  The study examined the interpretations of ‘substantial and compelling’ that were 
given before the Malgas case, the proposed method in Malgas and more importantly how cases 
have been interpreting the escape clause after Malgas. The dissertation looked to answer the 
following:  
                                                          







a) What were the reasons behind the imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws 
i.e.? The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997? 
b) Since the Act does not define ‘substantial and compelling’ how have the courts been 
interpreting the phrase when they make a decision on whether to depart from the 
prescribed sentences? 
c) Has the method of interpretation that was put forward in S v Malgas led to one consistent 
way of interpretation? Have the courts been strictly applying this method? 
d) What are the differences between South Africa’s sentencing laws and the sentencing laws 
of Minnesota where the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ was taken from? How has 
the state of Minnesota dealt with problems of interpretation? 
In this Chapter there will be a summary of the findings of this study, an analysis of the cases that 
were examined in the study, a discussion of the problems that the courts are currently facing in 
interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’, recommendations and suggestions for the sentencing 
regime that is currently in place and finally the conclusions to the study. 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
5.2.1 The Criminal Law Amendment Act 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act518 was a legislative response to persistent serious and violent 
crime.519 One of its aims was to restore the public’s faith in the criminal justice system. Its 
deterrent function is ‘attested’ to in Malgas520 when the Supreme Court of Appeal made a 
declaration that: 
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“In short the legislature aimed at ensuring a severe, standardized and consistent response to the 
commission of such serious crimes” 
The Act lists certain serious crimes such as rape, robbery and murder and prescribes the duration 
of sentence that a court must impose except where ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances 
are found. The Act also does not apply to child offenders. It was received with mixed feelings 
and criticisms against the Act can be divided into disapproval of the scheme itself, attacks on its 
use of poor language and the difficulty that has been had in trying to ascertain the legislature’s 
intention.521 Du Toit522 supports the criticism that has been levelled against mandatory minimum 
sentences and remarks that by imposing ‘arbitrary’ and ‘severe’ minimum sentences from which 
the courts can’t depart unless ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances have been shown to 
exist, the legislature has ‘driven a coach and four’ through these civilized principles. He goes on 
to add that the fact that the legislature has seen fit to use the courts as rubber stamps that must 
apply the legislature’s arbitrary sentences without regard to just punishment is unreasonable. He 
describes the mandatory minimum sentences as a breach of separation of powers that undermines 
the independence of the court making them mere ‘cat’s paws’ for implementation of the 
legislature's own inflexible penal policy.523 
Judicial officers have also continued to criticize the Act arguing that it limits their discretion. 
Despite the criticisms the Act continues to be in effect and was declared constitutional in the case 
of Dodo where it was held that the Criminal Law Amendment Act is not in violation of any 
relevant constitutional principle. 
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The impact that the Act has had to sentencing is difficult to measure and according to Sloth-
Nielsen and Ehlers524: 
“The information presented in this article suggests that there has been little or no significant 
impact with regard to any of the above goals (i.e. the problems the Act was supposed to address). 
It is unclear that the legislation has served a deterrent function, and the criminal justice system 
seems no closer to achieving consistency in sentencing than in 1997” 
It has also been difficult to make a determination on whether the Act has addressed the public 
perception that sentences are not severe. Survey data has shown that public fear of crime has 
increased over the past 5 years. The 2003 Institute for Security Studies’ victim survey has found 
that more people felt unsafe in 2003 than they did in 1998. One clear consequence of enacting 
mandatory minimum sentencing has been that there has been a great increase in the prison 
population causing prison overcrowding.525 
5.2.2. The ‘escape clause’ in the Criminal Law Amendment Act.526 
The Act allows departure from the prescribed sentences if ‘substantial and compelling’ 
circumstances are found. The requirement is that these circumstances must be entered on record. 
By saying that a court is supposed to enter the circumstances on record it means that “a court is 
required to spell out and enter on record the circumstances which it considered justified a refusal 
to impose the specified sentence”.527 In Flannery528 it was held that a requirement for the courts 
to give reasons concentrates the judicial officer’s mind and if the judicial officers follow this 
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rule, the reasons that they will give will more likely be sound.  The inclusion of the phrase 
‘substantial and compelling’ is probably one of the reasons why the Act survived constitutional 
scrutiny as this phrase leaves a bit of discretion with the courts. 
The legislature did not give any guidance on how the escape clause should be interpreted and it 
left it entirely to the courts. Establishing the true meaning of the escape clause has been 
extremely difficult for the courts. Keeping in mind that the Act lists serious crimes, it is 
important that this phrase is interpreted to reflect the intention of the legislature. The answer to 
the question of how the courts have been interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’ is twofold. 
There are interpretations that were given before the seminal judgement in Malgas and 
interpretations that were given afterwards.  
Before Malgas, other cases followed a more lenient approach to interpretation. The lenient 
approach does not view the Act as a piece of legislation that introduced entirely new principles to 
sentencing. According to this approach the normal aggravating and mitigating factors that are 
taken into account in the traditional process of sentencing are useful when it comes to the process 
of determining whether ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances exist. These traditional 
factors are weighed in order for a court to decide whether to depart from the prescribed sentence 
or not. With this approach factors such as the absence of physical injury, youthfulness, lack of 
previous convictions, remorse and the prospects of rehabilitation can amount to ‘substantial and 
compelling’ circumstances. There is no requirement that circumstances need to be exceptional or 
ones that the legislature could not have had in mind when they put forward the Act. 
The more balanced approach requires a rather lengthy process from the courts. With this 
approach the court has to weigh the cumulative impact of the traditional aggravating and 







application is seen in the cases of S v Van Wyk,529 S v Blaauw,530 S v Homoreda,531 S v 
Shongwe,532 S v Dithoze,533 S v Jansen.534 
Malgas proposes a set of guidelines that all the courts must follow when it comes to interpreting 
what ‘substantial and compelling’ means. This case is of extreme importance as it was endorsed 
by the Constitutional Court in Dodo. It puts forward that the phrase is to be viewed conjointly 
and not as two separate words. What one can say to be the essence of the Malgas judgement is 
that: These sentences have been imposed in order to severely punish offenders and ensure that 
the courts respond consistently and strictly when it comes to sentencing offenders of this crime. 
In the event that a court finds that there are ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ in a 
particular case, it must feel free to depart from the prescribed sentences. While the emphasis has 
now shifted to the severity of the crime, the traditional factors of sentencing must still be taken 
into account. The cumulative impact of mitigating and aggravating factors must be measured 
against the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ to determine whether a departure is warranted in 
a particular case. The cumulative impact of an accused’s youth, vulnerability to influence, fact 
that she had shown remorse and that she was young enough for rehabilitation was held to be 
substantial and compelling in Malgas and a departure from life imprisonment to 25 years was 
made. The Constitutional Court in Dodo adds a different dimension to the principles that were 
put forward in Malgas. It puts forward or rather emphasizes the proportional requirement which 
applies regardless of whether sentencing is being done under the Act or not. The proportionality 
principle demands that whichever sentence that a court imposes must be proportional to the 
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crime that has been committed. This is something that the courts must bear in mind when making 
a decision on whether to depart from the prescribed sentences or not. 
Malgas held that the strict interpretations that were being given to the escape clause are 
erroneous and that is not what the legislature intended. This means that the approach in cases 
such as Mofokeng has no place in the sentencing laws of South Africa. Although the 
interpretation that it put forward has received criticisms535 it remains the authoritative precedent 
for the courts up to now.  
With regards to interpretations of ‘substantial and compelling’ after the guidelines that were 
given in Malgas, the dissertation specifically looked at interpretations that were given in rape, 
murder and robbery cases. Other relevant cases were also discussed.  
5.2.2.1 AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF ‘SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPELLING’ IN THE DISCUSSED RAPE CASES.536  
One of the things that can be criticized about S v Abrahams537 judgement is that the judge 
although remarking that rape within a family was in no way less reprehensible the sentence that 
ended up being imposed is only 5 years more than the one that had been initially imposed by the 
High Court. This shows a hesitancy to impose life imprisonment. Van Der Merwe538 applauds 
the way the judicial officer arrived at the decision in this case. She is of the opinion that the 
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general manner that was used was correct as all the traditional aggravating and mitigating factors 
were considered. The important points are the role of a judicial officer during sentencing, 
acceptance of evidence having the potential to provide information on the effect of crime and 
lastly, understanding the interpretation of harm suffered by a child as a result of the rape.539 
Mahomotsa540 does not mention all the practical guidelines that were put forward in the Malgas 
case. It does however emphasize on the fact that in Malgas, it was held that the prescribed 
sentences should not be departed from for ‘flimsy’ reasons. The sentence that had been imposed 
by the court a quo is described as ‘woefully inadequate’ by the appeal court but no sufficient 
basis is given. The prescribed sentence of life imprisonment is also held to be too ‘severe’ but 
there is no outline of factors that were taken into account for the appeal court to arrive at this 
decision. It is however important to note these points from the case: 
a) a man’s virility was held not to play a part in the sentencing process 
b) The fact that a complainant had had sexual intercourse days before the rape cannot be 
used against them. 
c) The fact that the accused had lied about his age cannot be taken as an aggravating factor 
especially in this case as the accused had later disclosed his age. 
d) It was also highlighted that there is difference in seriousness when it comes to rape cases 
with this particular case being described as a ‘borderline’ one. 
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Mahomotsa does however establish a very ‘dangerous precedent’541 by mentioning that a 
survivor has to prove that they suffered psychological or mental damage after a rape. This creates 
a few problems. One of the problems is that the enquiry will now be focused on the victim and 
will shift from the offender making it seem like it is the victim that is on trial. Another of the 
problems is that a burden is now imposed on the prosecution to prove mental or psychological 
injury where it is not apparent.542 One of the principles that we can draw from this case is that it 
puts forward that not all rapes are the same and life imprisonment should only be imposed for the 
‘worst cases of rape’.543 
There is a clear principle that Mahomotsa establishes when it comes to sentencing. This is the 
principle that when a court is interpreting Section 51(1) of the Act when it comes to rape, it must 
exercise its discretion before imposing a sentence of life imprisonment.544 It emphasizes that this 
is a principle that emerges from the Dodo and Malgas judgement. What it is stressing is that just 
because a rape falls within the listed aggravating circumstances that are listed by the Act. It 
mentions that even if a rape falls within this category there are different degrees of 
seriousness.545  
 
In Njikelana546 we see the fact that the complainant had not suffered any serious physical injury 
was a huge mitigating factor. Although the psychological damage and trauma that the 
complainant had suffered as a result of the crime was acknowledged, Thring J emphasizes the 
fact that there were no significant injuries on the complainant’s body. 
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In S v M, Judge Satchwell seems to follow the legislation very strictly. This judgement has been 
described by Terblanche as ‘substantial but controversial in many respects’547 Judge Satchwell 
does not seem to exercise the discretion that has been given to the courts and seems to conclude 
that just because the rape fell within the listed aggravating circumstances, life imprisonment was 
the just sentence to impose. In other words, Satchwell just acted as a rubber stamp of the 
legislation.548 She did not grade the rape like the other cases have done and there was a disregard 
of circumstances that have been considered as substantial and compelling in other cases.549 
One of the important things to note about the Nkomo550 judgement is that the prospect of 
rehabilitation of an offender was identified as a substantial and compelling circumstance. Judge 
Theron AJA put forward a dissenting judgement in which she stated that there is no evidence to 
suggest that the fact that an offender has a prospect of rehabilitation should be taken into account 
as a substantial and compelling circumstance.551 Theron AJA was also of the view that if we look 
at the bigger picture, every offender has prospects of rehabilitation. However, the majority 
seemed to agree that a prospect of rehabilitation was substantial and compelling.552Mujuzi is of 
the opinion that in order to make a determination whether the prospect of rehabilitation falls 
under substantial and compelling it has to be asked whether it doesn’t fall under what the SCA in 
Malgas termed as ‘speculative hypotheses favorable to the offender and undue sympathy’553. 
Mujuzi describes rehabilitation as ‘initiatives taken by prison authorities to model the offender's 
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life during his time in prison in a way that when he is released from prison he has been reformed 
to such an extent that he is not likely to reoffend’.554 Mujuzi is of the opinion that for the SCA to 
say that rehabilitation is a substantial and compelling circumstance, it is saying that the offender 
will be rehabilitated by staying for a short time in prison compared to life imprisonment. This 
according to him is an indication of undue sympathy.555 The funding for rehabilitation has 
declined and the Department of Correctional Services has been unable to meet its rehabilitation 
targets. This is also proof that the prospect of rehabilitation remains a speculative hypothesis.556  
The court in Vilakazi557 focused so much on the fact that sentences should not be 
disproportionate and substantial and compelling circumstances need not be exceptional to qualify 
as such. It also highlighted a bit on the gravity of the offence that was in question and how that 
was relevant when it came to determining sentences. It quoted excessively from Malgas and 
found everything that was inconsistent with the Malgas judgement in the court a quo’s 
judgement to be erroneous. When it comes to the step by step practical interpretation put forward 
in Malgas, Vilakazi seems to focus more on how courts should not be vehicles of injustice 
instead of emphasizing that the prescribed sentences are a point of departure for the courts when 
it comes to sentencing. Terblanche is of the view that the essence of Malgas and Dodo would 
have been correctly reflected by saying that the prescribed sentences are a point of departure than 
saying how disproportionate sentences shouldn’t be imposed and how courts should not be 
‘vehicles of injustice’. 558 There wasn’t much emphasis on measuring all the factors traditionally 
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relevant to sentencing against the yardstick of substantial and compelling to determine whether 
to depart or not from the prescribed sentence although it was mentioned.559  
It is important to note that factors such as whether an accused is married or not, whether he/she 
is employed or unemployed or how many children the accused has were classified under the 
‘flimsy’ grounds that shouldn’t be considered when departing from the prescribed sentences. 
The judge was however quick to say that these factors can be useful in other situations. 
It is also important to note that in Vilakazi, we can get that it is not enough for one aggravating 
factor to be used as justification for the imposition of the prescribed sentence. The Appeal court 
noted that the court a quo had overemphasized on the fact that the complainant was 16 years old 
and neglected other factors that were present.  
With this said, I’m of the opinion that one can’t fault the decision that the Appeal Court 
eventually arrived at. A sentence of fifteen years seems more appropriate based on the 
circumstances that were presented before the court. With regards to its application of Malgas, 
we can see that the judge was in agreement with the principles mentioned in the case though he 
overemphasized some principles and neglected the other in a way. 
The court in S v PB referred to none of the other considerations that were mentioned in the 
Malgas case. The case also did not make reference to the proportionality requirement neither did 
they apply it to their judgments.560 Terblanche is of the view that in these cases there was too 
much stress on the principle that departure reasons need not be flimsy that the judicial officers 
ended up interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’ strictly.561 The refusal to interfere with the 
sentence of life imprisonment that had been imposed shows the court wanted to emphasize the 
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importance of imposing heavy sentences in these cases to prevent young girls from getting 
abused.562 
 
In S v MS563 there is no reference to the Malgas case but the principle that it put forward that the 
prescribed sentences should be departed from for reasons that are not flimsy. Victor J mentioned 
how the traditional factors that are relevant in sentencing should be considered and he goes on to 
do that. What is most important in this case is the mention of the Criminal Law Sentencing 
Amendment Act and the factors that it says must not be regarded as substantial and compelling 
when it comes to rape cases. The seriousness of the crime and the impact it had had on the victim 
made it hard for Victor J to set aside the six terms of life imprisonment that had been imposed by 
the court a quo. 
Perhaps the only notable thing about the S v Uithaler564 judgment is the fact that the court was of 
the view that when it comes to rape, the fact that an accused did not use excessive force during 
the commission cannot be taken as a substantial and compelling factor. There was no mention of 
other practical considerations that were put forward in Malgas. The court did however stress the 
point that courts should view the prescribed sentences as ones that must be ordinarily imposed 
and in the event that they find substantial and compelling circumstances, they are free to depart 
from the prescribed sentences565. This is a principle that the Malgas case mentioned. 
In rape cases, it is trite law that a complainant’s sexual history, the lack of physical injuries after 
the rape, any religious or cultural beliefs that the accused has about rape and any relationship 
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existing between the complainant and the offender prior to the rape cannot be considered as 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence.566 The 
rape cases that were analyzed in this dissertation spanned from 2002 to 2015. The principle of 
considering and weighing the traditional mitigating and aggravating factors seems to have been 
grasped firmly by the courts as this exercise was done by all the rape cases considered in this 
study. There was not any disagreement or criticisms of the Malgas judgement either. The 
principle in Malgas that is quoted excessively is the one where Malgas stipulates that courts 
must not depart from the prescribed sentences for ‘flimsy reasons’.567 
Not all of the cases made reference to the Criminal Law Sentencing Amendment Act which is of 
importance because it stipulates the factors that must not be regarded as ‘substantial and 
compelling’ in rape cases. Although in most of the cases considered in the study, none of the 
factors listed in the Act were taken into account there is a problem with S v Njikelana where the 
lack of physical injury was listed under the factors that had a cumulative impact on departing 
from the prescribed sentence. The proportionality requirement is also not mentioned in most of 
the cases except the emphasis Vilakazi put on it. One would assume that the proportionality 
requirement forms part and parcel of the guidelines that were given in Malgas as a result of the 
Dodo case. There is also a contradiction in the Vilakazi case. Vilakazi although stating that these 
factors can be useful in another regard, had declared marriage, children and employment as 
falling under the ‘flimsy’ grounds that were mentioned in Malgas. The contradiction is when the 
case considers the cumulative impact of the offender having a stable family and stable 
employment enough to warrant a departure from life imprisonment. 
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In light of the cases considered, there has not been a consistent list of factors that one can surely 
state will be ‘substantial and compelling’ in a rape case. Youth seems to play such a very 
important role in mitigation of sentence.568 Personal circumstances such as lack of education, 
absence of previous convictions also play a role in the cumulative impact of justifying departure 
but some judicial officers disregard these.569 Another interesting factor is the prospect of 
rehabilitation which played a role in departure in the Nkomo case. 
5.2.2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF ‘SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPELLING’ IN THE DISCUSSED ROBBERY and MURDER CASES.570 
In Khathi the fact that the deceased was a law enforcement officer was regarded as a major 
aggravating factor. It is unclear if it is because of this that Moshidi J viewed the personal 
circumstances of the accused as not extraordinary enough. However, it is without a doubt that it 
played a huge role in the decision that was made. There is express mention of Malgas in this case 
and the fact that one of the principles in Malgas is that the courts must not depart for ‘flimsy’ 
reasons is emphasized. 
The case of S v Mbatha puts forward an approach for courts who want to impose a greater 
sentence than the one prescribed in minimum sentencing legislation. Aspects of this are in 
disagreement with what was held in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mthembu v 
S. It will be discussed below how the omission to give guidance on upward departure by the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Malgas has led to confusion. 
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The case of Chowe speaks of the prospect of rehabilitation as a factor to be considered and 
deems a 26-year-old a good prospect of rehabilitation. The case also looks at the combination of 
factors, i.e. their cumulative impact in determining whether they can qualify as substantial and 
compelling circumstances. 
Matyityi can be criticized for an incomplete reflection of the judgement in the Malgas case.571 
There was no emphasis on the fact that Malgas mentioned that all the factors that are to be 
traditionally taken into account when it comes to sentencing should be factored in. The 
cumulative impact of these circumstances will then have to be mentioned against the yardstick of 
‘substantial and compelling’ to see if a departure is warranted. This was not noted in Matyityi, 
the judge focused on the prescribed sentences being the point of departure and avoiding 
departing from the prescribe sentences for ‘flimsy’ reasons. Even though the judgment can be 
criticized for this, it is hard to fault the conclusion that the judge arrived at as the offenders had 
murdered and gang raped.572   
Matyityi also emphasized the importance of accommodating a victim during the sentencing 
process. This was said to be important and that it enables a court to measure the impact that the 
crime had on the victim and also makes the court better informed.573 Another point that was 
emphasized was that whenever confronted with this problem, a sentencing court must 
independently apply its mind to the question of whether the prescribed sentence is proportionate 
to the crime. 
In Mahlangu we see the brutality of a crime being overemphasized and the fact that the accused 
persons had spent a lot of time in custody being disregarded. 
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Mthembu v S disagrees with S v Mbatha’s proposed approach for when a court wants to make an 
upward departure.574 
In the Buys case, we see a case where the personal circumstances of an accused person are held 
to not be enough to warrant a departure from the prescribed sentence. Factors such as remorse, 
the accused financial responsibilities, the fact that he had used a toy gun instead of a real 
weapon, the fact that no harm had been done to the victims were all held not to be substantial and 
compelling enough as the crime had had serious consequences and the accused had not been a 
first offender. 
Mogaramedi is a perfect example of a murder case where the judge strongly highlighted the 
aggravating factors to show that no amount of mitigating factors would be enough to depart from 
the sentence that was prescribed by the legislature.  
In the Montsho case, we see all of the personal circumstances that the appellant had being struck 
down and held not to be enough to amount to substantial and compelling circumstances. An 
important thing to note about this case is that it refuses to accept that the cumulative impact of 
circumstances should be considered but rather the circumstances themselves need not be neutral 
of all under flimsy reasons. A plea of guilty was also said not to automatically constitute remorse 
on the side of the accused and that in order to see whether an accused is remorseful one has to 
look at the accused’s actions and not merely what they say in court. 
In Ngwenya, the fact that the appellant was a member of the SAPS played a major role in 
determining the sentence. Even though there were personal mitigating factors, it seems these 
were overlooked because of the position of trust that the appellant held. There is no express 
mention of the guidelines that were put forward in Malgas in this case. 
                                                          







In Matjeke it is important to note that the proportionality element was regarded among the 
circumstances that were held to be substantial and compelling. This is something that hasn't been 
considered in other cases. Matjeke even cites the Vilakazi case as basis for this. The consumption 
of alcohol was also held to have influenced the accused in some way and Judge Ratshibvumo 
went on to hold this as a substantial and compelling circumstance as well. 
With the robbery cases, there seems to be a very strict approach from the courts when it comes to 
what constitutes ‘substantial and compelling’. Age was disregarded as a substantial and 
compelling factor in all the cases575 examined by this study expect the Chowe576 case. All the 
robbery cases considered endorsed the practical guidelines that were put forward in the Malgas 
case. Robbery being a different crime from rape, we see factors such as the value of goods 
stolen, the manner in which the robbery was committed and whether there was physical injury 
playing a crucial role in the decision of whether there must be departure from the prescribed 
sentences.577 Remorse and personal circumstances such as having little or no income, poor 
background, low levels of education and having been incarcerated for a long time awaiting 
sentence are disregarded by most of the cases considered in the study as well. One can say that 
with robbery cases, the manner in which the robbery was committed is emphasized when it 
comes to sentencing and it tends to overshadow any personal circumstances that the offender 
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might have. It should also be noted that being a member of the South African is a major 
aggravating factor.578 
The murder cases that were considered for the purpose of the study all seem to do things the 
Malgas way i.e. assessing the traditional mitigating and aggravating factors in order to determine 
whether a departure is warranted. Age579 was disregarded as mitigating factor in two cases that 
were examined in the study. The gravity of the crime is emphasized in brutal murders. This can 
be seen in Montsho, Mogaramedi and Khathi. In Khathi we see the judicial officer remarking 
that there was nothing extraordinary about the offender being 27 years old, having low levels of 
education and having a minor child. Life imprisonment was imposed despite this because the 
crime that had been committed was brutal and involved the murder of a law enforcement officer.  
In general, there has not been any disagreement with the practical guidelines that were put 
forward in Malgas. What can be seen is inconsistent application (factors that are considered as 
‘substantial and compelling’ in some cases are disregarded in other cases)580 and omission of 
some of the principles mentioned.581 This may be attributed to the fact that each case possesses 
its own set of unique facts. 
The method in Malgas has not necessarily led to one consistent way of interpretation. The study 
found that with some crimes judicial officers are more lenient.582 The two decisions namely 
Malgas and Dodo have led to what can be described as a ‘hybrid sentencing scheme’ which uses 
                                                          
578 As can be seen in S v Ngwenya. 
579 In Montsho where the accused was 25 years old the judicial officer dismisses this on the basis that there was no 
indication that the offender was immature. In Mogaramedi the fact that the accused was 49 years old was 
disregarded and the offender was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
580 An example can be S v Montsho, where antisocial personality disorder and narcissism are disregarded in 
sentencing. 
581 The proportionality principle is not mentioned in some cases. 
582 For example, judges overemphasize personal circumstances in rape cases but these are over emphasized when it 







factors that were used pre the minimum sentences to depart from the prescribed sentences. The 
long term result of this is that factors will be abused or misused to depart from these mandatory 
minimum sentences.583 
5.2.3 The discussion of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and a comparison with South 
Africa’s mandatory minimum sentencing regime.584 
The Minnesota sentencing guidelines were put in place for more or less the same reasons as 
South Africa’s mandatory minimum sentencing regime. They were put in place to address the 
sentencing disparities and to make sentences more ‘uniform and predictable’. The severity of an 
offence and the offender's criminal history were identified as the two factors that are most 
important when it comes to sentencing. The Minnesota guidelines consist of a grid system and 
the sentence is located where an offender's criminal history and the severity of the crime they 
committed intersect. The sentences are known as presumptive sentences. 
Departure from these presumptive can only be done when ‘substantial and compelling’ 
circumstances exist. These must be stated in writing and included in a departure report which is 
filed with the Commission. The sentencing guidelines of Minnesota have a comprehensive list of 
factors that can be used as reasons for departure and those that should not be considered by the 
courts when making a decision of whether to depart or not. Factors such as race, various 
employment and social factors may not be used as reasons for departure. Factors that may be 
used as reasons for departure are grouped into mitigating and aggravating factors. A mitigating 
factor can be that the victim was the aggressor in the commission of the crime while an 
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aggravating factor can be when a victim was treated with utmost cruelty during the commission 
of the offence. 
The guidelines also have certain offences that are subject to mandatory minimum sentences. 
These mandatory minimum sentences are to be departed from if there is an existence of 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances as well. The same comprehensive list of what 
constitutes ‘substantial and compelling’ and what does not is still applicable here.585 Departures 
may either be dispositional or durational. 
Upon comparing the two systems the study found that the systems were put in place for more or 
less the same reasons. Dealing with prison overcrowding was however not at the forefront of 
what South Africa wanted to address. The proportionality principle is a key feature of both 
systems as well. Minnesota has presumptive and mandatory sentences and South Africa’s system 
only has the mandatory minimum sentences without the presumptive sentences. In both systems, 
these sentences can be departed from when ‘substantial and compelling’ are found to exist. There 
is no grid system in South Africa like the one that exists in Minnesota, all the sentences are listed 
in the Criminal Law Amendment Act. Most importantly unlike South Africa, the Minnesota 
sentencing guidelines have a non-exhaustive list of what judges can take into account as 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances and what they should not take into account. 
Both systems have been criticized. Critics of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines say the 
guidelines have given the prosecutors so much power and stripped judicial officers of the 
discretionary powers they had. The mandatory minimum sentences were also criticized for this 
with the basis that the act was violating the principle of separation of powers. This argument was 
however struck down in the Dodo case. The mathematical formulas that are used in Minnesota 
                                                          







have also been criticized with the view that they reduce human beings to a number of points on a 
sentencing grid. The critics of South Africa’s mandatory minimum sentencing system argue that 
the sentences have not in any way reduced crime, they have led to prison overcrowding and the 
act in itself is broadly and poorly defined. 
Despite the criticisms, both systems have had their achievements. The study found that sentences 
have become fairer in the state of Minnesota. The release dates have become more predictable 
and sentencing disparities have reduced. In South Africa some reports suggest that there has been 
a decrease in violent crime and sentences have become stricter. Prior to the imposition of 
mandatory minimum sentences, for the crimes that are listed in Part 1, offenders were getting an 
average of 10 years in prison.586 
It is important to note that Minnesota dealt with problems of interpretation by including a list of 
what the judges can take into account as ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances and what 
they should not take into account.  
5.3 Discussion of Problems 
5.3.1 The flaws of the practical interpretation that was given in S v Malgas. 
Perhaps the most interesting question is whether Malgas clearly explained how the courts are 
supposed to deal with interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’. To a large extent, one can 
conclude that this case provided as much guidance as was possible. This is so because it sums up 
the intention of the legislature perfectly,587 states that ‘substantial and compelling’ does not mean 
exceptional, mentions that the factors traditionally considered in sentencing are useful in the 
enquiry and most importantly puts forward that the prescribed sentences should not be departed 
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from for ‘flimsy reasons’. The ‘flimsy reasons’ requirement has been emphasized by a lot of 
judicial officers and one can say that it has since become trite law.588 
Despite summing up the legislator’s intention perfectly and giving the judicial officers guidance 
on how to interpret ‘substantial and compelling’ one cannot run away from the fact that the 
absence of a ‘textual interpretation’589 of ‘substantial and compelling’ by Malgas is one of the 
reasons why a lot of inconsistencies still exist up to this date. A textual interpretation would have 
been really helpful, for example if there had been examples of what might constitute ‘substantial 
and compelling’ and what might not in a particular case. Perhaps the reason why the Malgas case 
did not provide a textual interpretation was for the purposes of maintaining the discretion of the 
courts. This, however has done harm as there are still inconsistencies which means the intention 
of the legislature is not being achieved. 
The guidelines themselves do nothing but advocate for the use of the traditional factors that are 
used when a court is sentencing an offender. If one looks at it strictly, ‘substantial and 
compelling’ could simply mean the traditional factors that our courts have long considered as 
mitigating circumstances. That is basically how the courts have been interpreting it as this is the 
guideline that is given in Malgas. There would be nothing wrong if the legislature had intended it 
to be so but enactment of mandatory minimum sentences show that there were problems with the 
system that existed then. It would be a bit puzzling if the intention was for the courts to take into 
account the ordinary mitigating factors. What this would mean is that nothing has changed but 
for the fact that the courts now have to measure the factors against the yardstick of ‘substantial 
and compelling’ which is not being interpreted consistently therefore creating further problems. 
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The word ‘flimsy’ means insubstantial which is the opposite of substantial, one cannot say that 
‘flimsy’ can be a guideline for the courts. What is flimsy for another judicial officer might well 
be very important for another judicial officer. Terblanche submits that there is nothing of value 
in the statement that judicial officers should not consider ‘flimsy reasons’.590 He states that no 
judicial officer would ever base a decision on reasons that he/she thinks are ‘flimsy’.591 The 
problem he identifies is that large gap that is between circumstances that could be considered 
‘substantial and compelling’ and those that are no longer to be ‘characterized’ as flimsy.592 
 ‘Hypotheses favorable to the offender, undue sympathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders, 
personal doubts about  the legislation and marginal differences in personal circumstances’593 are 
listed as some of the factors that must be excluded but looking at the cases that have been 
considered in the study, some of these factors have been taken into account by judicial 
officers.594 There is definitely an aversion to imprisoning first offenders and some judicial 
officers go as far as disregarding a previous conviction if it is in no way related to the crime that 
they are sentencing at that particular moment as justification for departing from the prescribed 
sentences.595 
While it can be difficult to determine whether the courts understood the last guideline that was 
given in Malgas which states that they must keep in mind that the crimes that are listed in the 
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Act have been singled out for severe punishment.596 Judicial officers are departing from life 
imprisonment to imposing sentences as little as 14 years.597 This means Malgas can also be 
criticized for not giving a margin for which the courts may depart. This makes the task of 
sentencing even difficult for judicial officers and creates the potential for huge sentencing 
disparities. 
Another question that can be raised is why the Malgas decision does not mention anything that 
relates to an upward departure. This led to the confusion that is evident from the Mbatha and 
Mthembu case. Mthembu completely disagrees with the method that was put forward in Mbatha. 
Departure is addressed but one has to wonder how a judicial officer who makes an upward 
departure can be checked to ensure that they have followed all the principles especially in 
matters where that upward departure is appealed.  
5.3.2 The inconsistencies/sentencing disparities and confusion that still exists in the system. 
a) Confusion 
One of the principles that is emphasized by Malgas is that when a court is satisfied that 
substantial and compelling circumstances exist, it can then depart from the prescribed sentence 
and go on to impose a sentence that it deems proportional to the offence that has been 
committed.598 In 2017, one would expect that this principle would be clear for judicial officers 
but unfortunately this is not the case.599  This confusion can be seen in the case of S v Seedat600 
where it was held that once a magistrate is satisfied about the existence of substantial and 
compelling circumstances, he/she is to suspend the imposition of sentence for five years and 
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make a restorative justice award.601 Although the Supreme Court of Appeal later held that this 
was wrong and incompetent, the Appeal court was not clear on the matter either.602 There have 
also been cases that have suspended sentences prior to that, an example is S v Alam.603 It has 
been declared by the Supreme Court604 that suspension is prohibited even when the judicial 
officer decides to depart from the prescribed sentences. 
b) Inconsistent interpretation of substantial and compelling. 
The ‘substantial and compelling’ standard for departing from the prescribed sentences is one of 
the ‘troubling’ aspects of South Africa’s sentencing regime. Over the years they have been more 
or less consistent results when this standard is applied by the courts.605 
An example showing there exists a huge inconsistency involves the Mahomotsa, Abrahams and S 
v M judgements. These cases all involved rape. Mahomotsa emphasized the need for courts to 
keep their discretion and that just because a rape falls within the aggravating factors it does not 
mean substantial and compelling circumstances cannot be found. This is a principle that is 
heavily entrenched in the Malgas and Dodo cases It also forms part of the guidelines for 
interpretation that were given in Malgas. Instead of following this principle that seems to be set 
in law, Judge Satchwell does the opposite in S v M where she fails to grade a rape and imposes 
life imprisonment. Grading the seriousness of the offence is the foundation of any sentencing 
process. It has long been emphasized that the punishment must fit the crime and that there must 
be proportionality between the sentence and the crime that has been committed.606  
                                                          
601 S v Seedat at para 36. 
602 S Terblanche “Sentencing” (2017) 30 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 102. 
603 2006 (2) SACR 613 (Ck) this was done in clear contravention of Section 51(5) of Act 105 of 1997. 
604 DPP, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 (2) SACR 567 (SCA) at para 23. 
605 S Terblanche “Sentencing” (2015) 28 SACJ 120. 







The inconsistencies are further exacerbated when the S v M judgement is compared with the 
Abrahams case. These cases have facts that are somehow similar. The aggravating factors in S v 
M were the age of the victim, the relationship that existed between the victim and the offender, 
the position of power that the offender had and the victim's vulnerability to the offender.607 
These factors are the same factors that existed in Abrahams as well. However, we see that in S v 
M a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed while in Abrahams the offender was sentenced to 
12 years imprisonment. The difference in the way these two cases were dealt with is shocking to 
say the least. It goes again the very same thing that the legislature wanted to address and it is an 
indication that the inconsistencies are still very common. There is no answer from the S v M 
judgement why there is such a huge gap. One would expect an explanation since the Abrahams 
judgement is quoted in the S v M case. 
Also, one would expect that the rape of a child is a major aggravating factor but in some 
instances, the rape of an adult and that of a child sees the same sentence being imposed. An 
example of this can be taken from Mahomotsa and Abrahams in comparison to S v Swart.608 In 
Swart, the offender had broken into the complainant's house and raped her repeatedly. Twelve 
years was imposed, the same as was done in Abrahams and Mahomotsa where child 
complainants were involved. Terblanche remarks that it is unexplainable how these judgements 
can have the same sentence.609 
A strict approach when interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’ has been warned against in 
various Supreme Court of Appeal judgements. It is surprising that a few judgements still choose 
to interpret substantial and compelling strictly even after these warnings. The cases of S v PB and 
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Matyityi have gone against this. This again is pointing to the fact that inconsistencies still exist 
when it comes to interpretation. Partly, the blame can be put on Malgas for that ‘flimsy reasons’ 
principle as this is what the two judgements emphasized and focused solely on. Both these courts 
criticized other judgements for frequently departing from the prescribed sentences for ‘flimsy 
reasons’.610 
The difference that is notable between the two cases is that PB was a first offender.611 What can 
be seen is too much stress on the requirement that the prescribed sentence should be imposed and 
a disregard of factors that would have had a cumulative impact in minimizing the sentence as is 
in the other cases that have been considered by the study.612 As a result, we see in S v PB the 
offender, who a first offender was getting the same sentence (life imprisonment) that a serial 
rapist would have got.613 This raises questions of whether the courts are having regard to the 
proportionality principle or whether they are paying attention to the inconsistencies their 
judgements are resulting in. What this is showing is that despite Malgas, some cases are still 
interpreting ‘substantial and compelling’ strictly. 
5.3.3 The failure of the courts to properly inquire into the existence of substantial and 
compelling circumstances. 
The application of ‘substantial and compelling’ as a standard for deviating from the prescribed 
sentences in the Act remains the most troubling aspect of the mandatory minimum sentencing 
regime.614 The Malgas judgement suggests using the ‘past sentencing patterns’ as a starting point 
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for the courts when they are determining sentences for the crimes that are listed in the act.615 In 
other words, what this is saying that the traditional factors that are taken into account in 
sentencing i.e. the mitigating and aggravating factors play an important role in determining 
whether ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances exist. What this entails is that a court has to 
make an inquiry into the existence of ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances (by looking at 
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances) in order to arrive at a decision that truly reflects 
the intention of the legislature. This creates a duty on the part of the courts. 
This was directly emphasized in the Calvin616 case. This case involved the rape of a 6-year-old 
victim and the court a quo had sentenced the offender to life imprisonment as per the prescribed 
sentences. The Supreme Court of Appeal however held that the trial court had misdirected itself 
by failing to consider all the factors that were present in this case. It held that there also had not 
been any steps taken to obtain evidence in order to make a proper assessment of whether 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances existed. This led to the life imprisonment sentence 
being reduced to twenty years. This judgement makes it clear that in order for a judicial officer to 
depart from the prescribed sentences, he/she must make a proper inquiry into the existence of 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances. In order for the inquiry to take place, a court must 
have all the necessary information and most importantly it has to show in the judgement that the 
court has taken into account all the circumstances that are available for consideration.617 
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It is also a general principle that any conclusion that a court arrives at should be properly 
motivated.618 
Although in some cases it is apparent which factors have been taken into account and what their 
cumulative impact is, that is not the case in all cases. This shows that there are some 
inconsistencies. An example of this can be seen in the Matyityi case and to some extent the 
Vilakazi case. Matyityi does not seem to emphasize on the fact that the traditional aggravating 
and mitigating factors must be taken into account. It is also doesn’t reflect in this judgement that 
all the circumstances have been taken into account. The judicial officer simply strikes down the 
accused’s age and remorse619 and mentions that the sentence that had been imposed by the court 
a quo was disproportionate to the crime and the interests of the society. 
Terblanche is also of the view that judicial officers in South Africa have become used to 
imposing the sentences that are prescribed in the Act that many are losing the required 
consideration that must be had to proportionality.620 This is true, not many cases make mention 
of the proportionality requirement.  
If a court does not make a proper inquiry and it’s not reflective in the judgement which factors 
were considered to arrive at a decision, there is a problem. Either the sentence that is arrived at 
will not reflect the intention of the legislature or there runs a risk of courts departing from the 
prescribed sentences for reasons that are not justifiable. This creates inconsistencies. The fact 
that even after Malgas, courts are failing to make a proper assessment in determining what 
constitutes ‘substantial and compelling’ indicates that there has not been much guidance or the 
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guidance that is in place is misunderstood or that there is a mere disregard of the steps that 
should be followed by the courts. 
5.3.4 Substantial and compelling circumstances in rape cases. 
Rape is one of the most violent and serious crimes. It is one of the crimes that led to the 
imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. Kubista621 is of the opinion that discretion has 
been left to the courts to decide whether to depart from the prescribed sentences and with rape, 
section 51 lists certain thresholds for sentencing and when those thresholds are crossed, the court 
must automatically impose a certain sentencing. This means that if a crime meets any of the 
requirements that are mentioned in Schedule 2 of Part 1, life imprisonment must be imposed. 
This might mean that the courts have been interpreting the Act wrongly and possibly considering 
‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances for departure where they should not. This was not 
clarified in the Malgas judgement or any of its confirmation judgements. Kubista goes on to say 
that the factors that are being used to justify departure from a minimum sentence should 
therefore not relate to the severity of a crime in these cases as the legislature has already dealt 
with that and predetermined which types of crime are to be punished and at what level that is to 
be done.  
She states that if the crime fits in Schedule 2 of Part 1 its ‘severity in relation to other 
conceivable variations of the crime or any subjective circumstances must be read to exclude 
circumstances relating to the severity of the crime’.622 In a nutshell, her point is that, for example 
if the rape falls within the ambit of the scenarios mentioned in Schedule 2 of Part 1, ‘substantial 
and compelling’ circumstances must be read to not include circumstances that relate to the 
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severity of the crime. The severity of a crime is a recurring theme in cases that were considered 
in the study. You find that judicial officers often highlight the way a crime was committed when 
deciding whether or not to depart from the prescribed sentence. 
Another worrying thing when it comes to considering ‘substantial and compelling’ 
circumstances in rape cases is that courts wrongfully require a higher showing of violence for 
them not to depart from the prescribed sentences.623 In S v Dzukudu it was held that rape in itself 
should be seen as a crime that is inherently violent.624 It is then surprising that judicial officers 
choose to use the absence of extreme violence in a rape as a mitigating factor or substantial and 
compelling circumstance when the crime in itself is of a violent nature. This is a disregard of the 
Criminal Law Sentencing Amendment Act625 which clearly states that ‘apparent lack of physical 
injury to the complainant’ should not be taken as a substantial and compelling circumstance.   
It is also confusing that in some cases it has even been said that not all rapes are the same and 
that life imprisonment should only be imposed in the ‘worst cases of rape’.626 Rape has been 
‘conceptualized on a continuum from bad to worse’ and it has been said that life imprisonment is 
only justified in the worst cases of rape.627 This can be problematic because rape violates a 
person’s bodily integrity and has been shown to have major psychological effects on the victims 
whether there were serious injuries or not. It has been described as an ‘invasion of the most 
private and intimate zone of a woman and strikes at the core of her personhood and dignity’.628 
In S v Uithaler the judge, correctly so, stated that the absence of physical injury in a rape should 
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not be taken as a mitigating factor as it does not in any way make the crime ‘less 
reprehensible’629 Terblanche is also of the view that the fact that the victim has not sustained any 
physical injuries cannot mitigate the seriousness of rape and goes on to say that this does not 
mean that this cannot be considered as an aggravating factor and make the crime worse than it 
already is.630 
S v Nkawu631 remarked that the absence of physical injuries cannot be taken solely as a 
substantial and compelling circumstances and that it would make no sense for it not to be taken 
into account when looking at the bigger picture. This makes sense, the problem is when there is 
an overemphasis that the rape lacked physical injuries and reliance on this fact to mitigate a 
sentence. 
Kubista is of the view that the starting point in these cases should be where life imprisonment is 
recognized as the sentence that has been ordained by the legislature before the lack of physical 
violence.632 The overemphasis of lack of physical violence in an inherently violent crime 
indicates that there is problems with the sentencing system and a possibility that the courts might 
be implementing their own mandatory minimum sentences633 whose effect will start to show in 
years to come. How a court can consider a factor that is prohibited by legislature in the inquiry is 
worrying to say the least. 
What can be seen from the rape judgements is that they believe that for a rape to warrant a 
sentence of life imprisonment it must fall under the worst cases of rape. What this has resulted in 
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is that the judicial officers have put themselves in a place where they constantly have to justify 
sentences that are lesser than life in most serious cases. These justifications are coming in the 
form of emphasizing factors such as the absence of bodily injury and in some cases, the absence 
of mental of psychological injury.634 What this has done is the judicial officers are focusing on 
the elements that justify the imposition of a lesser sentence instead of those elements that make 
the rapist more culpable. This ‘lenient language of downward departures’ being seen in rape 
sentencing judgements excuses rapists.635 It is necessary to emphasize that the study has found 
that the intention of the legislature in enacting mandatory minimum sentences was to respond to 
serious crimes in a way that makes sentencing more consistent and severe. By overemphasizing 
factors that should not be emphasized or that take away from the severity of the crime as 
‘substantial and compelling’, the intention of the legislature is being undermined.  
5.3.5 Substantial and compelling circumstances in murder and robbery cases. 
With the robbery cases, the courts seem to be following a strict approach where we see factors 
such as the age of accused persons being disregarded in some cases. Personal circumstances also 
tend to get sidelined in robbery cases. 
In murder cases there has been inconsistent interpretation. Factors that are regarded as 
‘substantial and compelling’ in other cases are disregarded in other cases. 
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5.3.6 The problem with considering rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling 
circumstance. 
The prospect of rehabilitation has been used as justification to depart from the prescribed 
minimum sentences.636 Consideration of the prospect of rehabilitation as substantial and 
compelling has caused a bit of controversy. This is not so for discretionary sentencing as the 
prospect of rehabilitation is a factor that is normally considered.637 In the S v S638 case the court a 
quo had used the prospect of rehabilitation to depart from a prescribed sentence. This prompted 
the appeal court to ask the following question, ‘Does the fact that the appellant is a first offender 
who is likely to be rehabilitated constitute substantial and compelling circumstances that would 
justify a deviation from the minimum sentence of life imprisonment’?639 Following this the 
appeal court reached the conclusion that the court a quo had misdirected itself and the other 
factors significantly outweighed the prospects of rehabilitation that the offender had. One can 
conclude that the appeal court did not view the prospect of rehabilitation as a worthy substantial 
and compelling circumstance, thereby answering the question that it had posed. This was not the 
case however in S v Nkomo. As previously stated in Chapter 3 in a dissenting judgement to this 
case, Theron AJA stated that there is no evidence that the prospect of rehabilitation should be 
taken as a substantial and compelling circumstance.640 
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The huge problem with using the prospect of rehabilitation as a substantial and compelling 
circumstance is that this is a factor that will be present in all cases except the few that will be 
exceptional or have a set of unique facts.641 This means that considering this factor as such will 
lead to a lot of unnecessary departures thereby circumventing the intention that the legislature 
had when they enacted mandatory minimum sentencing laws. The fact that the prospect was used 
for departure in Nkomo, leaves room for other judgements to erroneously do so as well. 
6. Recommendations 
The study has established that Malgas guidance has not proved to be helpful when it comes to 
achieving consistency in the sentencing system of South Africa. In the year 2000, the SA Law 
Commission after having researched and identified the problems in the sentencing system, 
recommended that a sentencing council be established with the task of creating guidelines for 
courts when it comes to sentencing.642 The Law Commission had found that like cases were not 
being treated the same, sufficient weight was not being given to serious offences, prisoners were 
being released too early because of overcrowding, there was no restorative approach to less 
serious offenders and sufficient attention was not being given to victims of crime.643 The study 
has found that some of these problems still persist 17 years later. 
Prior to that the Van Der Heever Committee had also identified that the wide discretion given to 
the courts is causing inconsistencies within sentencing and that there was an urgent need for 
sentencing guidelines to guide the courts.644Sentencing guidelines refer to any general standards 
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that guide the courts in determining the sentence that should be imposed in a specific case as was 
done in the state of Minnesota.645 The concept of sentencing guidelines has been frowned upon 
in South Africa because of the need to maintain the sentencing discretion of the courts.646 It is 
also notable that the courts647 have not considered any jurisprudence, cases or guidance from 
Minnesota but at the same time have not been particular about how to interpret ‘substantial and 
compelling’.648 
It is high time that South Africa admits that a sentencing scheme that includes normative 
sentencing guidelines is the only way that consistency can be achieved in a sentencing system. It 
is also the only way that the diverse opinions of the public can be met.649 Phelps is of the opinion 
that the government would do well if they ‘resurrect’ the recommendations that were given by 
the Law Commission in 2000.650 Minnesota's system of guidelines is and remains one of the 
most highly rated systems. It has achieved most of the objectives it had set out at the beginning 
and it is balanced and flexible to have adapted to the changing circumstances while retaining its 
‘simplicity and ease of use’.651  
A system that includes sentencing guidelines gives potential offenders a sense of what 
punishment they may expect if they go on to commit a particular crime. It is not enough to 
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merely state what the prescribed punishments are.652 Lack of sentencing guidelines however, 
allows the sentencing discretion of the courts to be exercised in an inconsistent way making it 
impossible to make a determination on whether like cases are being treated alike.653 What is 
needed in the South African system is consistent weighing of factors that constitute ‘substantial 
and compelling’ and the total disregard of factors that should not constitute ‘substantial and 
compelling’ by all judicial officers to achieve fairness. It has been submitted by various experts 
that the current system is lacking in ‘meaningful principle’.654 There is no guidance whatsoever 
for the courts and this has constantly led to inconsistent outcomes. 
In 2006, using the crime of rape as an example, Terblanche conducted a research on how 
different models of sentencing work. He used a factual scenario with two slight variations and 
went on to impose a sentence in terms of four jurisdictions. Two of these jurisdictions were 
South Africa and Minnesota. The purpose of the research was not to determine the severity of 
sentences in the jurisdictions that were used but to highlight the contrast that is there when it 
comes to determining sentences in a structured system like that of Minnesota and an unstructured 
system like South Africa’s.655The factual scenario was as follows656: 
“The accused and victim, both in their early thirties, have dinner together on a first date. Afterwards he 
drives her to a dark spot, and forces her to have sexual intercourse with him. He threatens her with 
physical violence, without being specific about this violence, which is sufficient to overcome her 
resistance. No physical injuries are caused, but the victim is traumatized, as can be expected. At trial the 
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accused pleads not guilty, offering consent as defense, but is convicted nevertheless. He is a first 
offender.” 
The factual scenario had the following variations:657 
“In terms of the first variation the accused uses a knife to threaten the victim, pins her down and 
manhandles her to the extent that she sustains a few bruises. In terms of the second variation, the accused 
is not a first offender, but has a previous conviction for rape, committed nine years before the current 
offence, involving a set of circumstances similar to the main scenario.” 
“In terms of the second variation, the accused is not a first offender, but has a previous conviction for 
rape, committed nine years before the current offence, involving a set of circumstances similar to the 
main scenario.” 
In terms of the main scenario, when the sentencing laws of Minnesota were applied, Terblanche 
came to the conclusion that a sentence of 4 years was most likely to be imposed. With regards to 
the first variation where the accused uses a knife to threaten the victim, it was found that life 
imprisonment was most likely to be imposed. With the second variation it was found that almost 
5 years would be imposed.658 
After applying South African law to the scenario and its variation, Terblanche found that in the 
main scenario, a sentence of 5 years would most likely be imposed. In the first variation where 
the knife is used 10 years would most likely be imposed. The second variation would most likely 
attract a sentence of 8 years.659 
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As previously stated, the purpose of this research was to compare the determination of sentences 
in structured and unstructured systems. When one talks of structure, what is meant is the 
existence of certain guidelines that assist the court in determining sentences. Terblanche finds 
that once one ‘gets a grip’ of how sentencing guidelines work, the task of sentencing is made 
easier.660 One gets into a position where they are able to predict with a certain degree of 
accuracy, the sentence that will be imposed in a particular situation.661 This is with reference to 
the Minnesota guidelines. It is notable that Terblanche found it much easier working with a 
system that included guidelines. He mentions that the use of guidelines make sentences more 
predictable which is a very important aspect as this can contribute to the consistency of 
sentences.662 He found that the same was not true for South Africa’s system. Even with 
knowledge of how the system works, one cannot predict a final sentence and it remains 
‘guesswork’.663 He goes on to add that many important aspects of the justice system of South 
Africa have not been addressed thoroughly or systematically.664 This is especially true for the 
interpretation of ‘substantial and compelling’. The guidance that was given is not making the 
sentencing task easier but creating further inconsistencies. 
The following is therefore recommended to assist the courts in interpreting ‘substantial and 
compelling’ more consistently: 
1. The establishment of an Independent Sentencing Council. The Sentencing Council should 
comprise of 2 Constitutional Court judges, 2 Supreme Court of Appeal judges, 2 trial 
court judges, 1 prosecutor, 1 defense attorney, a member of the Correctional Services, 2 
                                                          











sentencing experts and 2 citizens who have been victims of the crimes that are listed in 
the Act. This Council’s objective will be to create sentencing guidelines for interpreting 
‘substantial and compelling’ for South Africa’s sentencing system. Terblanche rates the 
success of the commission that was established in Minnesota as one of the reasons why 
the Minnesota Guidelines are highly regarded to this date.665  
2. The Sentencing Council’s first task will be draft a list of the principles that the South 
African sentencing system seeks to embody or in other words emphasize the intention 
that the legislature had when it promulgated the Act. Sentencing guidelines that are 
drawn up in light of clear principles ensure that like cases are treated the same.666 These 
principles should also be flexible to ensure that the courts retain their discretion and to 
also make room for the unusual cases.667  
3. More importantly, after extensive research the Sentencing Council will be tasked to 
create a comprehensive but not exhaustive list of what factors the courts can take into 
account when making a determination whether ‘substantial and compelling’ 
circumstances exist. This list will include mitigating factors and aggravating factors and 
another list of factors that should not play a part in the decision to depart or impose the 
prescribed sentence. 
4. A direction to the courts from the council that in the event that it sees reason to depart 
from the prescribed sentences, it files the factors that it has found to warrant a departure 
with the Sentencing Council. 
5. The Sentencing Council will also conduct an annual research and analysis of cases that 
fell within the ambit of the Act to ensure that the courts are following the guidelines. 
                                                          
665 Ibid 14. 










8. Conclusions  
The aim of this dissertation was to determine how ‘substantial and compelling’ is being 
interpreted by the South African courts and whether it is being interpreted consistently. The 
study has established that the phrase ‘substantial and compelling’ is not being interpreted 
consistently by the South African courts. Certain factors that are taken into account by other 
courts are disregarded by others.  
Another important discovery made by the study was that South Africa can learn a thing or two 
from the Minnesota sentencing guidelines. The state of Minnesota has made it easier for the 
courts to interpret ‘substantial and compelling’ by providing a list of the mitigating and 
aggravating factors that a court may take into account in making a determination on whether to 
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